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The most explosive phenomenon of modern contemporary
history has been the friction between the aspirations of "national
minorities" and the

ambit~ons

of "ruling majorities. " Strictly

speaking, the problem is not new.

It is as old as recorded history.

Its intensity in recent times has been greatly stimulated by the

2

demands of every ethnic group for an independent political existence;
by the use of fair and foul means by these groups to attain that goal;
.
.
by rivalries among great and small powers that often stimulate false
hopes and national aspirations; and by the successful emergence of

i·
many new states.
This thesis explores briefly two experimental cases,
Czechoslovakia and Poland, where between 1919 and 1938, efforts
were made to solve the 1 'minority problem." This.thesis consists
of five basic parts:

Chapter I, an introduction that defines or

describes such concepts as nationalism, nation, state, and minority;
Chapter II that succinctly presents backgrounds and problems of
minorities in Czechqslovakia (Germans, Magyars, Ruthenians,
and Jews), and Poland (Germans, Jews and Ukrainians); Chapter III
that analyzes the provisions of the Minority

T~eaties

prepared by

the principal Allied Powers at the end of World War I to protect
minority rights within Czechoslovakia and Poland; Chapter IV that
examines the implementation and results of the planned protection
of minority rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland between 1919 and
1938; and Appendices that illuminate the minority problem in the
two states.
The conclusion of the thesis deals with five characteristics
of human behavior and human relations that surfaced in C zechoslovakia and Poland between 1919 and 1938.

The perception of

3
nationality was the first revealed characteristic.

The second was

the need to recognize the importance of the acceptance factor in all
assimilation objectives.

The great difference, in the minds of the

minorities, between equality and tolerance was a third characteristic.

The fourth was the realization that time, by itself, does not

solve the minority problem.

The fifth and final revealed character-

istic was the absolute ne_ed for humanitarianism at both leadership
and loc.al levels.

By connecting these five charact"eristics with the

contemporary scene, the thesis contributes to greater interest in,
and greater knowledge of, the continuing problem of the national
minority.
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PREFACE
The most explosive phenomenon of modern contemporary
history has been the friction between the aspirations of "national
nrlnorities 11 and the ambitions of "ruling majorities." Strictly
speaking, the problem is not new.

It is as old as recorded history.

Its inte.nsity in recent times has been greatly stimulated by the
demands of eve.ry ethnic group for an independent political existence;
by the use of fair and foul means by these groups to attain that goal;
by rivalries among great and small powers that often stimulate
false hopes and national aspirations; and by the successful
.emergence of many new states.
This thesis

e~plores

briefly two experimental cases,

Czechoslovakia and Poland, where between 1919 and 1938, efforts
were made to solve the "minority problem.

11

This thesis consists

of five basic parts: Chapter 1, an introduction that defines or
d~scribes

such concepts as nationalism, nation, state, and minority;

Chapter II that succinctly presents backgrounds and problems of
i;runorities in

Czechos~ovakia

(Germans, Magyars, Ruthenians,

and Jews), and Poland (Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians);
Chapter III that analyzes the provisions of the Minority Treaties.

iv
prepared by the principal Allied Powers at the end of World War I
to protect minority rights within Czechoslovakia and Poland; .

Chapter IV that examines the implementation and results of the
planned protection of minority rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland
between 1919 and 1938; and Appendices that illuminate the minority
problem in the two states.
The conclusion of the thesis deals with five characteristics of
human behavior and human relations that surfaced in Czechoslovakia
and Poland between 1919 and 1938.
the first revealed characteristic.

The perception of nationality was
The second was the need to

recognize the importance of the acceptance factor in all assimilation
objectives.

The great difference, in the r.ninds of the minorities,

between equality and tolerance was a third characteristic.

The

fourth was the realization that time, by itself, does not solve the
minority problem.

The fifth and final· revealed characteristic was

the absolute need for humanitarianism at both leadership and local
levels.

By connecting these five characteristics with the con-

temporary scene, the thesis contributes to greater interest in, and
greater knowledge of, the continuing proble1n of the national
minority.

I first became aware of the severe minority problems faced
by Czechoslovakia and Poland during a course in 20th Century_
Eastern Europe at Portland State University.

Continuing course

v

discussions' with Dr. 'Basil Dmytryshyn suggested a close connection between the minority crisis faced by those new states and
the growing problems of' today.

I am indebted to Dr. Dmytryshyn

for sharing with me his substantial knowledge of the people and
politics of the subject countries, and to the members of the thesis
committee for their many sugge.stions on matters of construction
and content.

The problem of the national minority can be only

lightly illuminated by this thesis; further illumination must await
further scholarship.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

From Israel to Yugoslavia, from Quebec to Northern Ireland,
from Africa to Asia, from the Americas to the Soviet Union, one
hears the cry of the minorities.
recognition.
wrongs.

It is a call for a homeland and for

It is a plea for opportunity and for correcting past

It is an entreaty that seeks preservation of a culture,

language, religion, and ethnic identity.

It is a very complex and

emotional problem that is as old as recorded history and as current
as today's newspaper.
The cry has its source in nationalism, a force that is both
very strong and very vague.

In the words of C. J. H.· Hayes, an

eminent student of the phenomenon, "Nationalism, as we know it,
is a modern development.

It has had its origin and rise in Europe,

and through European influence and example it has been implanted
in America and all other areas of western civilization."
1

1

An early

Support for nationalism as such a force is found in the
introductory chapters of the following works, all by recognized
authorities on nationalism. See C.J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A
Religion, (New York: The Macmilla·n Company, 1960); Boyd C.
Shafer, Faces of ·Nationalism, (New York: H~rcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, Inc., 1972); Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning a·nd

2
recognition of nationalism came from Johann Gottfried von Herder
(1744-1803), a German churchman, poet, and philosopher who, in
the late 18th century, developed the theory of the nation as a
11

cultural community based on a common language.

n

2

The 19th

century saw Herder's cultural nationalism spreading over all of
Europe,

3

growing in the climate of liberalism that followed the

French Revolution and the Napoleonic era.
The growth of cultural nationalism was particularly strong
in Eastern Europe where the many minorities were politically
divided among foreign rulers.

Centering on possession of a

language, a tradition, or a religion, cultural nationalism benefited
from several new factors.
education.

One of those was the qualitative rise in

Another was the steady rise of the middle classes and the

urbanization of the general populace that followed.

Still another

was the development of political parties (that gave a voice to some
groups), and the pre·ss that spread that

voi~e

to an increasingly

literate population.

History, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1965); Alfred
Cobban, National Self-Determination, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1951 ). Also see International Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences, Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc., Vol. 11, pp. 63-69.
For Hayes quotation see Hayes, ..QP.· cit., p. 1.

2

c ob ban,

3

.QR·

cit. ,. p. 56.

Hayes, .QP.· cit., p. 66.

3
Cultural nationalism in Eastern Europe developed gradually
into political nationalism - that is, a conscious search for a state
within which to preserve and develop the culture.

This political

nationalism was greatly encouraged by the emergence of such new
unified nations as Italy, Germany, and Romania - all of whom we re
born in the last half of the 19th century with the help of blood and
iron.

One new nation, Norway, was of particular importance in

that it was born in 1905 of pure negotiation, giving nationalism an
example of a peaceful, non-revolutionary path to follow.
The growth of political nationalism, however, was impeded
in Eastern Europe by the autocratic regimes of the four ruling
empires - German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian.
This block was removed with the dissolution of all four empires
during the course of World War I, thus creating the opportunity for
new states.

4

The growth of cultural nationalism through education,

urbanization, and communication created the cohesiveness
necessary for group action.

The democratic development of

France, Britain, and the United States, based on majority rule
and the consent of the governed, set the example for the minorities
to follow.

4

At the close of World War I, nationalism in Eastern

By 1918, the Russian and Ottoman empires had collapsed,
while the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary was imminent.

4
Europe was poised for new· and rapid growth .
.A discussion of "nationalism" and "nation" requires a

description of those much used words,
requires a specific definition.

5

while the word "minority"

Scholars of nationalism such as

Hayes, Shafer, Kohn, and Cobban, all agree on the difficulty of
defining nationalism.

6

They also agree that nationalism, among its

many characteristics, is very personal, that it is acquired and
retained by perception, and that it is subject to change.

With these

authorities as the guide, and for purposes of this thesis, the
f9llowing simplified desc:i;iption of nationalism is offered.
Nationalism is a state of mind that exhibits a primary loyalty to,
or affection for, a place and a group where one identifies with a
common culture and a common language.

The place is usually an

historic homeland and the group is usually those people who share
the same loyalty or affection.
As in the case of nationalism, scholars are also cautious
about defining a "nation. " While a common concept considers a
nation synonomous with a state, the concept that is used in this
5

Definitions of nationalism and nation are beyond the range
of this thesis -- a description is believed to be more appropriate.

6As an example of the definition problem, Hayes takes an
entire chapter to define nationalism. (Hayes, op. cit., pp. 1-10)
while Shafer avoids any strict definition but lists ten basic
attributes of nationalism {Shafer, op. cit., pp. 17-20).

the sis separates nation and state.
the word

11

For the puroses of this

nation" describes a "group {of some size) of people U:nited

usually, by residence in a common land, by a common heritage and
culture, by common interests in the present and common hopes
to live together in the future, and by a common desire to have and
maintain their own state .. "

7

To

illu~trate

this concept, the

Ukrainian and French-Canadian nations exist today within the
USSR and Canada.
The word "minority,

11

as used in this thesis, needs an

explanation as well as a defin~tion.
American might be

b~tter

In the United States, the Polish-

referred to as an American-Pole in that

his primary identification is with his American citizenship even
though he maintains a concern for his Polish heritage and culture.
This is not generally true in Eastern Europe and specifically, for
purposes of this thesis, in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

In Eastern

Europe, including the subject countries, the minorities are large
groups of people that have a long history of occupying their prese.nt
lands.

1:_~ey~v.!: their own langu~ge, t~~i..-ap._d,, more:

o~ h~ve neve::,.. wilH:wngl;:t.J.e~t. tl_?.~!._an~~~s.

They con-

sider themselves Magyars (Hungarians), or Germans, or Slovaks, or
Ruthenians, whose fate placed them under the political control of

7shafer, op. cit., p. 15.

Emphasis added.

~

6
some 'state that differs from their own nation.

With this in mind,

for purposes of this thesis, the definition of a minority will be: S:_
population group that has a primary identification with its own
perceived nationality, which differs from that of its state of
residence.

Thus a Magyar in Czechoslovakia is part of a defined

minority while his brother in Hungary is not.
The end of World War I brought the victorious Allied and
Principal Powers together at the Paris Peace Conference.
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Point plan for peace, proclaimed in
January, 1918, set the guidelines for the Conference.

8

Self-

-determination, as described. in Point V of the Wilson plaµ, was
the leading principle.

9

Across Eastern

Europ~

this principle of

self-determination excited the many minorities and brought them to
Paris to plead their cases for independence.

It soon became

apparent to the conferees that the re-alignment of the states of
Eastern Europe could not follow strict nationality lines.

Almost

8 see Appendix D for a complete text of Wilson's Fourteen
Points. The Wilson speech was delivered on January 8, 1918,
but prior events had set self-'determination in motion. 11'.l the
fall of 1916, a British Foreign Office Memorandum stated the
"principal of nationality should be one of the ·governing fa_ctors in
the conside.ration of territorial arrangements after the war. 11 In
March, 1917, the Russian Provisional Government announced
support for "the right of the nations to decide their own destinies.
See Cobban, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
9cobban, op. cit., p. 116.

11

7
~very

decision involving state boundaries necessarily created, or

left, minority groups within the new state.

As the party responsible

for the final state decisions, the Conference had a very real concern
for the welfare of the new, or remaining, minorities.

That concern

took the.form of special Minority Treaties with each of the new states
of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, as well as the
form of sp.ecial provisions in the peace treaties with Austria,
Hungary, and Bulgaria.
Two of the new states, Czechoslovakia and Poland, presented special problems.

A combin:ation of geographic and economic

considerations, plus a complete intermingling of ethnic populations
within many villages and cities, led to unanticipated and very large
minorities.

Overnight the old rulers (Germans and Magyars) became

ruled minorities - while some of the old minorities (Czechs, Slovaks,
and Poles) now became rulers.

10

Once the boundaries, and thus

the minorities, were in place and the treaties in force, the years
between 1919 and 19 3 8

11

brought only increasing minority problems

10

.
The use of the terms "rulers" and "ruled" needs an
explanation. Henceforth, the thesis will refer to the population
group holding political control of the state as the 11 rulers" (the
Poles in Poland) and to the minorities within the new state as the
"ruled. 11 Where the reference is to a ruling class or group of
leaders, the thesis will so state.
11

By 1938 the effects of Hitler's actions were distorting
all minority situations.

8
instead of the desired national unity.
Buried somewhere in the ambience of the Paris Peace
Conference, in the Minority Treaties that followed, and in the
subsequent interchange between the rulers and the ruled of
Czechoslovakia and Poland, may be a better understanding of the
basic interests of the ruling majority and the ruled minority.

CHAPTER II
THE MINORITIES - BACKGROUNDS AND PROBLEMS

Who were the minorities of Czechoslovakia and Poland during
the years from 1919 to 1938?
each group?

What was the historical background of

What special problems did each minority present to

the ruling majority?

Before addressing these questions, a brief

background review of each country is necessary, for in that background are some of the latent factors that had an effect on the Paris
Peace Conference as well as on the post-war treatment of the
minorities.
Frantisek Palacky ( 1798-1876 ), author of the History of
Bohemia .and considered one of Czechoslovakia's great men,
argued that "Natur-e knows no ruling and no serving nations.

11

1

Nature has had much to do with the Czechoslovak state as one
can see from a look at the geography of Europe.

Composed of

two primary sectors (Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia) and one

1

R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks,,
(Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), p. 186.

10
smaller sector (Ruthenia),

2

Czechoslovakia of 1919 had generally

.distinct frontiers, geographically speaking.

The new state was

bordered by the Bohemian forest on the southwest, by the Ore and
Sudeten mountains on the west and nor.thwest, and by the Carpathian
mountains on the north and northeast.

In the south were the

Carpathian foothills that tapered down to the Danube and the
Hungarian plains, marking Slovakia as an area quite distinct from
Hungary.
Each of the three sectors of Czechoslovakia had its own
I

I

-characteristics.

The historic home of the Czechs was the ancient

!

area of Bohemia-Moravia, separated from Slovakia as early as

l

j·

l

!l
i

900 A. D. when the Magyars moved north out of Hungary into Slovakia but not westward to Bohemia.

With river and land passages

j

I

to the north, and the Magyar control to the east, the Czechs were
heavily influenced by western societies in general and by the
Germans in particular.

3

The Slovaks, on the other hand, have

historically been forced to look south to Hungary.

The mountains

that were their home, and the Magyar control that blocked their

2

William V. Wallace, Czechoslovakia, {Boulder: WestView
Press, 1976), pp. 135-36.
The technically correct name for
this area is "Sub-Carpathian Ruthenj.a" or 11 Podkarpacka Rus. 11
It bordered on Poland, Romania, and Hungary -- hereafter
referred to as "Ruthenia. 11
3

R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 251.

11
opportunities, led the Slovaks into an isolated and backward existence
as compared with the Czechs or Magyars.

The third sector,

Ruthenia, was at the extreme eastern end of the new state.

With

the Carpathian mountains. separating them from their kin in Galicia,
the Ruthenians lived an isolated mountain life, dominated and
economically controlled by the Magyar rulers.

4

The Czechs were the dominant group in. the new state and
they brought to the state a number of great advantages.

In addition

to a sound economic base in Bohemia, the Czechs had also
developed one of the best balanced societies in Europe.

With no

traditional ruling or aristocratic class, the bourgeoise, workers,
and peasants all participated in society to some degree.

That same

society produced a number of very competent leaders, men who
were_ recognized for basic ability as well as leadership, and who
were led by Thomas G. Masaryk (1850-1937) President of the new
state until 1935.

5

In spite of these advantages, the new state was

still a major gamble when one bears in mind the long standing and
very prominent German bloc in the Czech lands (see Appendix C},
the basic differences between Czechs and Slovaks, and the substantial

:Ibid. , p. 324. Ruthenia 1 s common horde rs with Poland,
Hungary, and Romania gave it a strategic importance. Since
1946, Ruthenia has been a part of the USSR.

5

.

Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars:
1918-1941, 3rd ed., (Hamden: Archon Books, 1962), p.· 1.84.

12
Magyar population and control of Slovakia and Ruthenia.

It should

also be noted that these lands were part of the Austro-Hungarian
empire as 0£ 1914.

While under the rule of the Austrian Germans,

the Czechs continued a prominent role in the Czech historic lands,
while the Slovaks and Ruthenians under Magyar rule were described
as "dominated and deprived. "

6

Poland in 1919 presented an entirely different situation
from that of Czechoslovakia.
very old country.
Key to Europe,

7

The new state was a re-birth of a

Raymond Leslie Buell, in his book, Poland: The

.

desc1·ibes Poland of the 16th and 17th century as

the flfreest state in Europe • • • in which the greatest degree of
constitutional, civil, and intellectual liberty prevailed. " He goes
on to term Poland the "melting pot of Europe,

11

with "almost com-

plete toleration and an asylum to those fleeing from persecution in
all Western lands."

He also maintains that the complications of

the later minority problems are partially rooted in the influx of
Germans, Jews, lvlagyars, Russians, and others who sought asylum
in Poland.

However, by·the 18th century, the ruling classes of

Poland had become so oriented to self-interest that "independence

6 R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., see Chapters XIII and
XIV for details of Czech and Slovak political and cultural life
under their Austrian-Hungari~n rulers.
7

Raymond Leslie Buell, Poland: The Key to Europe, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), pp. 28-29.

13
for all" had become "oppression for a11° under an almost anarchial
condition.

In this same era, Europe saw the rise of Austria,

Prussia and Russia, with Poland squarely in the middle.

The

expansive pressures of these three powers, together with the
leadership vacuum in Poland, led to a series of three partitions
between 1772 and 1795, whereby Poland was divided among the
three powers, and ceased to exist as a state in 1795.

8

The Polish state died, but it is most important to remember
that the Polish nationality did not.

Throughout the more than one

hundred years of life in partitioned Poland, the Polish people
m.aintained their nationality.

The partitions divided the country

into three areas: western Poland went to Prussia, southern Poland
became a part of Austria, and the center and eastern areas were
incorporated into Russia.

In 1807, Napoleon created the Grand

Duchy of Warsaw, and in 1815, the Congress of Vienna created out
of the Duchy a political unit known as the Congress Kingdom,
centered in Warsaw and with Polish administration, but under
Russian rule.
From 1795 to 1914, the position of the Poles under each of
8

1n addition to the Wandycz test cited in Note 38, the story
of these partitions may be also found in R.H. Lord's, The
Second Partition of Poland, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
(1915), and Herbert H. Kaplan's, The :F'irst Parition of Poland,
·(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962).

14
the powers (Russia, Austria, Prussia-Germany) varied considerably.

Under Russia, while there was much discontent, there was

Russian recognition of the permanency of the Polish nationality and
there was always an element of Slavic relationship. 9 In the Austrian
sector, the problems of the Habsburg rulers in their own heartlands
after 1867 led to an autonomous rule for southern Poland (Galicia).
While the Poles of Galicia had opportunities to grant local control,
their control efforts were always aimed at "polonizing" Galicia in
spite of the presence of two very large minority groups - UkraiD.ians,
who made up almost half the population; and Jews, who made up

1
about 10% of the population and were very prominent in local trade. O
The situation in the Prussian (German) sector of Poland was
quite different and bears on the later developments regarding the
•t y. 11
.
G erman m1nor1

Briefly, the German goal in Poland was to

make the Polish lands a permanent part of Germany by colonizing
(an active policy under Bismarck) and by converting the :Poles into

9 Buell, op. cit., pp. 57-59. This does not refer to friendship but more to a co-;;;-mon denominator that did not· exist in the partitioned lands ruled by Prussia and Austria. While the Russians
envisaged a vague Pan-Slav empire, the Poles constantly resisted
Russian rule, rebelling in 1830 and again in 1863.
I Olbid., pp. 62-63. Also see 0. Halecki, A History of
Poland, (New York: Roy, 1943), pp. 259-260).

11 rn 1871, Prussia became part of the German.Empire.
continuing references will be "German" instead of "Prussian."
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Polish-Germans.
objective.

12

The effect of this policy was the reverse of its

The Poles were not converted.

On the contrary, in

.addition to some armed resistance, the Poles ·adopted a policy they
termed "organic work.

11

This policy turned away from insurrection

and concentrated on the development of Polish economic and social
interests within legal limits.

The late Professor Oscar Halecki,

honorary editor of the Slavonic Review and noted authority on Poland,
states the policy was pursued in all three partitioned areas with
.
'
13
great benefit to the Polish people.
The Polish people at the start of World War I were a nation
without a state.

Yet the historic lands of Poland, the return of which

the Poles were constantly demanding, did not constitute a state of
one nationality.

These historic lands had been the home of millions

of non-Poles for generations.

The actions of the Polish ruling class

in the years before and during the partitions showed little evidence
of Polish acceptance of any principle of federation or understanding
of minority rights and aspirations.
With this brief but basic background of the new Czechoslovakia

12

Buell, op. cit., pp. 59-60. Halecki,· op. cit., p. 257,
puts it more strongly, alleging it was a Bismarck policy to "exterminate the Poles. 11
13
Halecki, op. cit., pp. 258-62. These pages deta~l the
application of the policy in each of the partitioned areas as well as
the resulting preservation of Polish life.

17
and the re -born Poland in mind, the backgrounds and problems of
the principal minorities of those new states can now be reviewed
(see Appendix A, B, C, for a racial and religious breakdown 0£ the
populations of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1921 and 1931).

14

As

the census shows, over 34% of the population of Czechoslovakia was
non-Czech or non-Slovak.

In the new Poland, a comparable figure

for non-Poles was almost 31%.

These millions of "non-people"

were the minorities.

MINORITIES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In addition to the large minorities within the new state, the
Slovak population presented the Czechs with a special situation.
Though a part of the new state by name and law, the Slovaks were
distinctly different from the Czechs in language and in almost all
modes of life.

15

They numbered about 2, 000, 000 as compared

with about 6, 800, 000 Czechs.

While never possessing its own

state, the Slovak nation had a long history of national activity in

14

The 1921 figures are accepted as essentially accurate

for 1918.
15

R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., Chapter XIV. The
commentary. on Slovakia is a summary of the very complete
review of Slovakia under Hungarian rule as found in this
chapter.

18
spite of constant Magyar pressure.

16

In the 17th century, while

Hungary was under. Turkish rule, Magyar nobles turned Slovakia

into a center of Habsburg loyalty and resistance to the Turks.

17

Following the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in
1867, the Magyars launched a strong Magyarization program across
all their lands.

In Slovakia the Magyarization effect was to severely

retard Slovak economic, educational, and cultural development.

18

Even though the Slovaks were dominated and deprived, the
·Slovak nationality survived in the homes, fields, and villages and
surfaced from time to time in the form of Pan-Slavic theories and

in the presence of Slovak leaders such as Ludevit Stur (1815-1856)
and Joseph Hurban (1827-1888}.

19

As one ponders the nature of

each minority, this Slovak situation tells something of the inherent
strength of the force called nationalism.

While the Czechs and

Slovaks shared a common Slavic heritage, their development was

16 Ibid., p. 253. In addition to Magyar rulers, German
colonization dated back to the 13th century when German settlers
established their own towns, with special German codes of
privileges, such as the 11 1\tfagdeburg Law."

17

lbi d. ' p. 2 5 5 •

18
1n 1868, the Hungarian "Law of Equal Rights of
Nationalities" was enacted, but historians such as R. W .. SetonWatson and C. A. Macartney agree that the law was only a
facade, behind which the policy of total Magyar rule was locally
carried out.
l 9R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 259-264.

19
substantially different.

The successful uniting of these

~wo

nations

under one state· was a tribute to the enlightened leadership of men

such as Masaryk and the Slovak leader, Anton Stefanik ( 1880 1919).

20
Apart from the Slovaks, who became part of the ruling

majority, there were four principal minorities in the new state:
Germans, Magyars, Ruthenians, and Jews.

21

The review of these

groups will follow the form of answers to three questions: How did
they get there? What was their economic and cultural situation in
1918?

What special problems did they present to the new nation?

Germans in Czechoslovakia
There are historical records of both German and Czech
occupation and

r~le

of the lands of Bohemia that are so intertwined

as to lead Robert Seton-Watson, eminent scholar and authority on
Eastern Europe, to assert, "It is very

di~ficult

to decide what are

the relative proportions of Celtic and Teutonic blood in the population

ZOibid., pp. 244-46, and pp. 311-12. While much has
been written about the leadership of Masaryk, this text
includes an excellent summary of Masaryk by one who was
a close fiend and ally.
Stefanik was a leader of the new state
11
-movement, now enshrined in national legend as Slovakia's
greatest hero."
21 There were also 75, 000 Poles -- largely in the Teschen
area of Silesia where there was a major bprder dispute with
Poland, See Appendix B and C.

20
of today. 112 ~
very late.

Germans came to Bohemia very early and stayed

German colonizing of Bohemian lands, going back to

'the 12th and 13th centuries, brought such heavy German influence
that the Ge:r:mans have been referred to as "forming something not
far removed from a state within a state.

1123

In 1918, the Germans

were recognized by the Czech leadership as well as the Paris
conferees as a major problem to the new state, so much so that
the Czech leader, Thomas Masaryk, in advocating the principle of
nationality stated that it was this very principle that required this
large German minority to remain within the new state,. his
reasoning based on the very heavy mixture of Germans and Czechs
in "almost.all the cities of Bohemia."

24

The compromise with

ethnic unity in this German situation was dictated by economic
considerations on both sides.

Many German industrialists in

Bohemia preferred to remain with their Czech markets while
Czech industry recognized the viable economic life of the new

22

R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 11.

Seton-Watson

wrote this book in 1943.
23Ibid., p. 17, For a history of Bohemia, see R. J.
Kerner, Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century, {Orno: Academic
International, 1969).
24
Robert Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England, (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1943), p. 128.

21
state depended on retention of the

Germa~-dominated

industry.

25

While the German minority present~d many problems in areas of
culture, education, and native languages, this econon1ic consideration was over-riding.

The Paris conferees recognized the

dangers but voted unaminously for the Czech historic frontiers
rather than for some gerry-mandered border aimed at reduction of

.
.
26
t h e G e rman m1nor1ty.

Vaclav Benes, in his paper on Czecho-

slovak Democracy and Its Problems
Czech cultural position.

27

compares the German and

He states that while the Germans had a

somewhat higher living standard, and were more conscious of rank
and class than the Czechs, the differences were not very great.
The special problems presented by Germans were their very size,
prominence, and long resident-history.

Those problems were

complicated by the presence of both the Weimar Republic and
German Austria, giving the German

n~inority

two neighboring states

to look to for protection, sympathy, or support.

25

J. W. Bruegel, "The Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia, 11 in History of the Czechoslova~ Republic: 1918-1948, ed.,
Victor S. lv1amatey and Radmii Luza, (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1973), p. 171. Hereafter cited as HCR.
26
27

Ibid. , p. 171.

HCR, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

22

Magyars in Czechoslovakia
There were about 750, 000 Magyars in Slovakia and Ruthenia
in 1918, and they had been there as rulers for a very long time.

As

.of 1918, Magyars were almost 25% of the total population of Slovakia

and about 20% of the population. of Ruthenia.

The Magyars held a

dominant position in trade and commerce and, according to Vaclav
Benes, held and worked the more fertile ·plains of southern
Slovakia.

28

This left Slovakia and Ruthe nia with a very difficult

problem as the ruled became the rulers.

The Slovaks and Ruthenians,

who had suffered from a very backward econon:iic and educational
system under the Magyar rule, found themselves without the tools
of leadership.

Seton-Watson points out that the number of "educated

and nationally conscious Slovaks in 1918 did not exceed 750 to 1, 000,
while in Eastern Slovakia "hardly a single candidate for office wa·s
available.

n

29

A further complication was the wide spread refusal of

Magyar civil servants, teachers, and professionals to serve the new
state.

This made it necessary to staff the governmental offices and

schools of Slovakia and Ruthenia with Czech personnel, a decision
that created a further irritant.
The special problem presented by the Magyar minority was
28Ibid., p. 47.
2 9R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 283.

11

23
the conversion of the rulers into the ruled - a transition made even
more difficult by the continuing active support given the Magyar

minority by Hungary. Everyone welcomes the chance to move up
to rule but few, if any, will willingly step down to be ruled.

Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia
Ruthenians and Ukrainians are historically and ethnically the
same people.

The Ruthenians became separated from their Ukrainian

kin in eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and the Russian Ukraine many
centuries ago.

They settled in the Carpathian mountains .just east of

Slovakia where they lived an isolated life under Magyar rule.

Within

Ruthenia they were a majority (62%) - Magyars and Jews comprising

17% and 13%, and Czechs only 3% of the population (see Appendix C).
The Magyarization policies of the rulers resulted in Magyar dominance of education as. well as almost total Ma.gyar and Jewish control
I.

I

of trade and industry.

Seton-Watson tells of the very deprived

condition of the Ruthenia.ns in education, economics, and political
representation, indicating the Ruthenians were "seemingly ripe for
. i" as s1m1
•
·1a ti. on. "30
f ina

But the Ruthe·nian nationality lived on.

It was kept alive in

the isolated lives of the mountain villages and homes, by periodic

3 olbi.d., p. 324. Ruthenian activity from 1919 to 1938
indicates that Seton-Watson misjudged the durability of Ruthenian
nationalism.
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25
cultural revivals led by local leaders such as Adolf Dobriansky
(1817-1901), and by the many errtj.grants residing in the United States

and Canada. When the voices were heard for the new Czech-Slovak
state, Ruthenian representation was present from the beginning.
Ruthenian National Cowicils appeared within Ruthenia and Ruthenian
emigrants

wer~

part of a Congress convened in the United States in

July, 1918, to discuss Czechoslovakian independence.

31

This small and remote province contained non-Czech
minorities that made up 96% of the provincial ·population.

In joining

with the new state, Ruthenian leaders sought an autonomous arrangement.

It was this autonomy requirement that presented the major

problem to the new state - how to grant autonomy to this remote
province in the absence of any cadre of Ruthenian administrators?

Jews in Czechoslovakia
The Jews in the new state were a small group, concentrated
in Slovakia and Ruthenia but also present in Bohemia-Moravia.
Appendix B and C shows a religious population of 360, 000 and a
"racial" population of 180, 000.

The Jews of Slovakia and Ruthenia

came largely from Galicia and Russia and almost immediately
identified with the Magyars, becoming not only Magyars, but the

31

Ibid., p. 324. The Congress was held in Homestead,
Pennsylvania, and inclu<!ed a broad area of Eastern European
concerns.

26
most vocal Magyars.

32

Economically, these Jews became the small

merchants, the middlemen, the money lenders, and gradually

became prominent in all trade and industry.

In the Czech lands of

Bohemia-Moravia, the Jews were mingled with the German population,
and involved in both industry and finance.
In the village-oriented societies of Slovakia and Ruthenia,
there was substantial anti-Semitism.

In the words of Stefanik, the

Slovak leader, "The Jew is considered the
and they

~re

feared everywhere."

33

~xponent

of the Magyars

Seton-Watson supports the

Stefanik opinion by saying, "It cannot be denied that the Jews explaited the Slovak masses and played the game of their Magyar
oppressors."

34

The problem of anti-Semitism was of major concern to the
Czechs as they assumed the leadership of the new state.

As the

Germans and Magyars were reduced to secondary roles in the
new administration, it was necessary for the Czechs to make this

32

The Jews are an exception to the desc.ription of an east
European minority.
Some Jews identified with their state of
residence, but most of them did not. See Appendix A a:nd B for
the number of Jews claiming a Jewish nationality.

33Harriet Wanklyn, Czechoslovakia, (London: George
Phillip and Son, Ltd., 1954), pp. 403-404.
34 R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 272. In discussing
Slovak anti-Semitism, Seton-Watson sees Jewish actions as a
major cause.

27
change without drawing anti-Semitic accusations from the many
Jews that were a part of the German and Magyar structure.

35

At

the same time, the Czechs had a great need for the talents of the
Jews in the administration and development of Slovakia and Ruthenia,
the provinces where anti-Semitism was most prevalent prior to

1918.

MINORITIES OF POLAND

The 1921 census showed 31 % of the population to be nonPolish.

While there were more than I, 000, 000 White Russians in

the eastern provinces, the minorities that were of primary concern
to the Poles and to historians we-re the Germans, Jews, and

. .
36
Uk ra1n1ans.

Germans in Poland
"Drang nach Osten". {movement or pressure to the East) has
been a German slogan or mission for a long time.

37

An aggressive
-- -- ------·--- -

-----

35 Ibid. , p. 325.

36

Although a defined minority, the concentration of
historians on the Germans, Jews and Ukrainians as the principal
.minorities justifies the omission of the White Russians from
this thesis.

37

Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and
Action: 1815-1945, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955). This
entire text deals with this subject in detail.
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people, the Germans long ago realized that any westward expansion

...------

was blocked by the French and could be achieved only by conquest.
To the east, however, lay great open areas, thinly populated and in
need of both a skilled labor force and creative management.

The

rulers of the eastern l.ands recognized this need to develop the lands
and so history records many instances where German immigration
was encouraged - by Russians, Magyars, Czechs, and Poles.
German emigration was likewise encouraged by Germans for it
furthered several German objectives, among them being population
relief, future German markets, and the development of a German
position in the local society that would assist future Gerrnan
expansion.
This latter objective, a German position in the local society
was also pursued through a policy of colonizing.

In

~

886, in support

of the nationalistic "Hakatism" movement, Bismarck promoted a
major colonizing program throughout the eastern provinces of
Posnania and Pomorze.

38

The Polish reaction to Hakatism and to the

colonizing program brought the Poles ever closer together, making·
38
Piotr S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitional Poland: 1795!2J&, (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1974)·, p. 225. This German colonizing of Poland, the later Polish colonizing of Galicia, and
the Czech colonizing of Slova~ areas all bear a striking resemblanc~ to
the current Israeli colonizing of the West Bank and the Sinai; particu- · /
larly so since many of the Israelis, including Be_gin, cai.!ie___~!'.Q.!n-__ Poland.
See also Halecki, o_p. cit., p. · 258. "Hak,atism, ''aEerth.e initials ~f
its leaders, became synonomous with German nationalism.

29
the Poles of Germany "the most nationalistic faction of the Polish
nation, and the most bitter enemies of Germany. ,,

39

The industrial influence of the Germans in Poland was substantial and widespread.

In Upper Silesia, the Germans were very

prominent at both management and worker levels.

In the textile

center of Lodz, within the Russl.an partition, the Germans were
about 10% of the population and held the majority of the engineering,

.
.
40
technical, and executive positions.
Economically and culturally, the German minority in restored
Poland was better balanced than either the Poles or the other
minorities.

The Germans ranged from industrial executives to

workers, from large estate owners to small farmers, from urban
dwellers to the villagers.

Whether due to land selection or land

management, German farms had a

11

much higher yield per hectare 1141

than the average Polish farm, and Germans held a large share of the
wealth of the western provinces.
The special problem presented by.this German minority was

at least threefold.

First, was the substantial economic position of

the Germans and how to .meld their industrial and agricultural base

3

9Buell, op. cit.,. p. 60.

4 olbid. , pp. 246 -4 7.
4llbid., p. 24 7.
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with the Polish efforts.

Second, was the threatening shadow of

Germany, with a large Polish population in her eastern lands and
smarting from the loss of the partitioned provinces.

The third

major problem area related to the many natures of the individual
Germans.

Could they live with or under the Poles?

Where did their

loyalties lie? Hugh Seton-Watson saw it all as a most serious problem, for which he could offer no solution and, by way of en1phasis,
commented on German regard for the rrGerman race appointed by
God to rule."

42

Numbering from 800, 000 to 1, 000, 000, less than

4% of the total population, the German influence went far beyond
their numbers.

Jews in Poland
The 1921 Polish .census showed about 2, 100, 000 Jews in
Poland that claimed Jewish nationality, with about 3, 100, 000 that
identified with the Jewish religion {by 1931, the nationality total was

up to 2, 700, 000).

43

The Jewish minority wa.s about 10% of the total

population and the largest group of Jews in the world outside of the
42

in 1943.
comment.

Hugh Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 281. This was written
The climate of war may have had an influence on the

4 3The census indicates that. about 1, 000, 000 Jews claimed
a Polish nationality for various personal reasons. The Jewish
nationality increase in 1931 reflects the polarizing trend discussed
in Chapter IV.
See Hugh Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 414.
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United States.
for.

Origins are indistinct at best, but a review is called

Eastern European Jews have two branches - the Western or

Sephardic branch came out of Spain in the late 15th century and found
their way into Europe via the Ottoman empire.
Askenazi branch has two origins.

The Eastern or

Some of the Askenazi Jews are

no doubt descendants of the Diaspora (the wanderers from the Holy
Land).

Some may also go back to the Khazars, a Mongol tribe from

the steppes of Eurasia that adopted Judaism back in the 9th century,
'
44
and were known to have reached Poland in the 14th century.
Probably the largest number of Jews in Poland came out of
western Europe, responding to two primary incentives.,

First,

Polish rulers had a long history of encouraging Jewish and German
immigration.

Going back to the 13th and 14th century, kings such as

Boleslav in 1264 and Casimir the Great in the mid-14th century
welcomed such immigration and granted these Jews special privileges
and protection against clerical opposition.

In those long-gone days,

the Jews were needed to fill the growing requirement for merchants,
tradesmen, and financiers, for the Polish population provided only
nobility or agricultural labor, a situation similar to many other
European states.

The second migration incentive came out of the

rising anti-Semitism of the west, fed by the increasing intolerance

44Ibid. , P• 288.

33
of the church as well as the gradual entry of the non-Jewish population into the occupations that were originally and thep traditionally,
Jewish. 45
As the Jews spread across ·the Polish lands, they developed
a heavy urban residence.

While numbering about 10% of total

population in 1921, there were some very substantial concentrations.
The city of Bialystok in Polish Lithuania was about 75% Jewish in

1919.

A smaller town of Sokolka (total, 5, 500) was 60% Jewish.

Cracow had 30, 000 Jews out of a total population of 90, 000, and the
industry {textiles) of the city of Lodz was controlled by Jews and
Germans.

46

This urban presence resulted from the Jews turning to

the obvious economic needs (merchants, tradesmen, the professions),
the difficulty of acquiring land in many areas, and a disinclination
toward agriculture on the part 0:£ many Jews.
Several factors combined in Poland to create an atmosphere ./~/
of anti-Semitism.

Within the cauldron

of a

re-born nationalistic

Poland could be found a large Jewish presence, a Catholic Polish
tradition, and a poor, war-ravaged economy.

The Jewish presence

45

Arthur L. Goodhart, Poland and the Minority Races,
{London: George Allen and Urwin, Ltd., 1920). Celia S. Heller,
On the Edge of Destruction, (New York: Colun1biB~ Univ. Press, 1977).
While there are many historical references to· this J'ewi:sh m.overneil.t,
excellent summaries are found in the Appendix of the Goodhart diary
and in the first two chapters of Heller.

46

Goodhart, op. cit., pp ....13, 46, 110, 123.

34
was complicated by the Jewish tradition, for the Jews lived apart.
The Orthodox Jews (most of the Jews in Poland) dressed differently

in their long caftans, hats, and beards.

They worshipped differently

with their Saturday Sabbath setting them apart in a predominantly
Catholic land.

They talked differently, not only with the Yiddish

language but also with gestures, expressions, and mannerisms that
set them apart.

In the opinion of Celia Heller, Professor of Sociology,

Hunter College, they maintained a "high visibility" with the probability that 80-90% of the Jews were instantly identified as Jews

. h t or soun d . 47
upon s1g

This innate separatism of the Jews recycled

opinions against them and contributed to the anti-Semitism.
There was also a political factor.

Some of the Jewish youth,

in turning away from Jewish ways, had a tendency to join with the
Germans and the Bolsheviks, Poland's two principal adversaries.
The Goodhart diary, a personal account of the counsel to the
Morganthau Mission sent to Poland in 1919 to investigate the position
of the Jews, has repeated references to the Polish hatred for the
Jewish Bolsheviks and the constant use of that label as the excuse
for many forms of anti-Jewish violence.

48

What exactly was a Jew in Poland in 1919? A Pole? A
47

48

Heller, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

.

Goodhart, op. cit., pp. 70-103.
on the Bolsheviks in Poland.

Chapter III concentrates

/
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citizen? An alien?

To appreciate the need for the questions and

the difficulty in coming up with specific answers, it will be helpful

to review very briefly some Jewish history of the 19th century. In
1791, the French National Assembly granted full citizenship rights
to Jewish subjects.

In the following century,

11

Jewish emancipation

in most countries of Western Europe was complete. ,,

49

With the

opportunity for full citizenship, the Jewish community was faced
with the problem of clarifying their religious, nationality, and
citizenship status.

A Reform Movement called for changes that

·would maintain the Jewish ·religion while altering Jewish dress codes
and even Sabbath observances.

The Reform objective was to

encourage the Jew to be a Frenchman or Englishman or German,
but of the Mosaic faith.

Orthodox Jews rose in opposition, holding

to the need for Jewish nationality, and a Conservative Movement
arose between the two extremes.
Organized Jewry in Poland of 1919 remained officially
Orthodox.

The majority of ·Jews in re-born Poland held to Jewish

ways and a Jewish nationality, but there were some defections.
Some of the defectors were known as "assimilators,

11

a term

applied to that segment of the Jews that took (or tried to take) the

491sadore Epstein, Judaism, (London: Penguin Books, Ltd.,
1959), pp. 290-91. Chapter 21 of this text gives details of the
problems and movements that the study so briefly summarizes.

'36
.
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. ·1ation.
pat h o f ass1m1

Specifically, this involved changes in dress,

habits, diet, manners, and language - in short, be a Pole, but of the
Mosaic faith.

The assimilators were iew in number and tended to

be the wealthier and better (or broader) educated Jews.

Assimilation,

however, while reducing Jewish visibility, did not make the assimilators "Polish."

In many public and private ways they

~ere

"exposed" as hidden Jews in a land that was predominantly Catholic.
Meanwhile, the Orthodox Jews were splintering their political
position with the Zionist and the Bund movements.

The Zionist

held strictly to a Jewish nationality and for a Jewish homeland,
Israel.

The Bund was the party of the Jewish Socialists.

Their

interests were primarily in a class struggle, not in Zionism and not
in the Jewish people as a whole.
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The special problem presented by the Jews was not primarily
numbers or economic position or daily conflicts - it was just a
simple hatred.

Most of the Poles seemed to hate most of the Jews.,

and since the Jews were both numerous and often strategically

50

Note the definition of assimilation - to "absorb into the
cultural tradition of a population. 11

51 aoodhart,

op. cit.,

pp. 192-93. For additional
.support for these generalizations, see Epstein, op. cit.,
pp. 309-316 in Zionism, and Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers,
(New York: Harcour.t, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 292-94
on the Bundist movement.
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positioned in their urban pursuits, it was a very critical problem.
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Ukrainians in Poland
The historic lands of the Ukrainian nation range from the northern shores of the Black Sea, north along the basins of the Dnieper
and Dniester rivers, to the Galician provinces of Lwbw, Tarnopol, and
l

l

Stanislaw6w.

I

eastern branch of the Slavic people, whereas the western branch in-

~

1·

The Ukrainians and Russians are both part of the

I
cludes the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks.
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Centuries ago the Ukrain-

ians developed their own language and distinct culture although their
political history is one of division under Russian, Polish, Lithuanian,
and Austrian rule.

There have been brief intervals of independence,

starting in the days of ancient Kiev (9th and 10th centuries) and
occurring periodically up to 1917 when a People 1 s Ukrainian Republic
was proclaimed following the collapse of Imperial Russia.

54
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After a study of the Heller text, the Goodhart .diary of the
Morganthau Mission, and the writings of Buell, Seton-Watson, and
Wandycz,· the phrase, "The Poles hated the Jews" seems the only
accurate way to put it.
5 3Buell, op. cit., p. 254.
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A very complete review of Ukrainian history may be found
in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 2 Vol., ed., Volodymyr
Kubijovyc, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1963). See also D.
Doroshenko, History of the Ukraine {Edmonson: Institute Press, 1939);
Michael Hrushev~ky, A History of Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University.
Press, 1941); and William & D. Allen, The Ukraine, {Cambridge:
The Univ. Press, 1940).
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The new Poland included about 4, 000, 000 Ukrainians.

They

were a majority of the population of eastern Galicia (until 1918, an

.! .

integral part of the Austrian empire) and Volhynia (until 1917, an
integral part of Imperial Russia).

They considered themselves

Ukrainians, had their own language, and were educationally and
culturally somewhat behiJJ.d the Poles, Russians, and Austrians that
had dominated them over past generations.

In the formerly Russian

sectors of eastern Poland, the Ukrainians held to the Orthodox faith,
forced on them by the Russian Czars, Nicholas I and Alexander II,

.

.
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while the Uniate faith was prevalent in most of Galicia.
The primary economic orientation of the Ukrainian lands was
agriculture, with some of the best. soils and growing climates in all
of Europe.

It was this great food potential that provided the agrarian

base for the people and commanded the attention of the ruling classes
of eastern Europe.

Note, however, that the land ownership was

substantially in Polish hands and the city populations of GaliciaVolhyn~a

.

were principally Polish and Jewish.
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In the Galician provinces of the new Poland, the autonomy
granted the area by Austria in 1867 had resulted in a Polish

55

Buell, op. cit., p. 33. The Uniate church was established
in 1596 by Polish and Lithuanian interests in an attempt to combat
.Russian ties among the Ukrain~ans. It recognizes the authority of
· Rome but retains Sla vie liturgy.

56 Ibid. , p. 2 74.
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administration that attempted to "Polonize" .Galicia at the expense of
all things Ukrainian.

In spite of this handicap, Ukrainian nationalism,

in 1914, was alive and ready when World War I presented the
.opportunity for new growth.
The special problems presented by the Ukrainians were
their majority position in the lands that made up Poland 1 s leading
agricultural area, and their kinship to the 30, 000, 000 or more
Ukrainians of the Soviet Ukraine.

An added

compli~ation

was the

religious di vision between the Orthodox and Uniate Ukrainians and
the re.ligious opposition of all Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Poles.
The minorities of the new Poland i~-iade up 1nore than 30% of
the total population and presented the new· state with wide - ranging
interests and special problems.
was little. agitation for

Unlike Czechoslovakia where there

independ~nce

in the decades leading up to

World War I (federation was the most expressed. objective),

57

Polish

pre-war interests and history led the Poles only to independence and
a restoration of their "historic lands" - lands that were historically
that of a state of nationalities, not a Polish national state.
These were the minorities of Czechoslovakia and Poland on
the eve of World War I - the Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles that were

57Robert Kann, The Multi-National Empire, 2 Vol., (New
York: Columbia Press, 1950), .Vol. 2, Chapter IV.
This
chapter documents this federation objective, using quotations from
Thomas Masaryk.
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about to become rulers; the Germans and Magyars that were about
to becon1e ruled minorities; and the Jews, Ruthenians, and
Ukrainians that were about to come under new political rule.
Cultural nationalism, in varying degrees, was present in all of
these population groups, while political nationalism was awaiting
only the opportune moment to surface.

CHAPTER III

THE MINORITY TREATIES

Throughout World War I the minorities of Eastern Europe
sensed the new political climate.

Though the war was ravaging their

lands and economies, the chance for recognition of individual
nationalities was obvious, and the minorities were not idle.· Polish
interests and actions surfaced acros.s Europe and in the United
States.

Between 1914 and 1916, Polish volunteer troops were in

action against Russia under Joseph Pilsudski (later to become
"the father" of Poland).

In 1917, Roman Dmowski (the subsequent

leader of the right wing National Democrats), became president
of a Polish National Committee based in Paris with offices in
London and Rome.

Ignacy Paderewski, the world famous pianist

and leading Polish representative at the Paris Conference, was
very active in the United States on behalf of the committee. .Finally,
in 1917, a Polish army was formed in France, placing the Poles on
both sides in World War I.

1

1
Halecki, op. cit., pp. 276-78. The entire Chapter 25
.
of this text is recommended for its detail .of Polish activity during
this period.
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Czecho-Slovak activity followed a similar course, with leaders
such as Thomas Masaryk traveling constantly in support of their
cause.

Militarily, Masaryk estimated that there .were 128, 000

.Czecho-Slovak troops in action at the time of the atmistice, the
most prominent force being the 92, 000 men that made up the Czech
legions in Russia following the appearance of the Provisional
Governme~t.

2

From Britain, France, and the United States, came

support for special consideration of the Jews of Eastern Europe as
well as both general and specific support for the Czech, Slovak, and
Polish independence movements.
The new growth of

3

n~tionalism

was suddenly and dramatically

accelerated on January 18, 1918, wh.en President Wilson presented
to a joint session of Congress his now famous
Program for Peace.

11

Fourteen Point

114 A careful reading of Wilson's entire text

is necessary for a full understanding of

~ts

impact on the many.

2 R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 298-305. Chapter XV
of this text ·details the great political and diplomatic activity of
the Czech and Slovak leaders and should be read with the cited
Halecki text to appreciate the extent of the total minority activity
by the time of the Paris Conference.
3

There were many shades of opinion among the Allied
Powers but no serious voices were raised in opposition to a new
Poland and Czechoslovakia. The United States was a stronghold of
most movement; note the "monster meeting" held in New York
City on Sept. 15, 1918 in support of Polish, Czech, Slovak, Jugoslav,
and Romanian causes. R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 306.
4

For the complete text, see Appendix D.
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concerned nationalities.
or a Pole in

Pari~,

To an emigrant Czech in the United States,

or a Slovak struggling for a Slovak school in his

home town, or perhaps to a member of any of the minorities,
concerned over preservation of perceived nationality, Wilson's
words heralded a new era.
understandings,

71

The President denounced "private

and pleaded for "strict observance of the principle

that in deterntlning all such questions of sovereignty, the interests
of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the claims

of

the government. " He also called for a "readjustment of frontiers

along lines of nationality," insisted that "relations of Balkan States
be determined by hi stork lines of allegiance and nationality, " and
favored an "absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous develop11

ment." Finally, he committed the United States and himself to

an

independent Polish state," and called for ·11 an association of nations
to guarantee

pol~tical

independence to great and small states alike. "

Not as well publicized as the Fourteen Points, but adding
emphasis to his position, were certain of Wilson's speeches and
earlier communications regarding the changing scene as he saw it.
The most famous of these was his speech of February 11, 1918,
which strongly re-affirmed the principle of self-determination.
5

5

Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, {Cambridge:
Riverside Press, 1921), p. 317. The speech of February 11, 1918,
gave special emphasis to the interests of people and promises,
stating "they were not to be chattels and pawns in a game • • • of
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According to Stephen Bonsal, Chief Interpreter for the American
delegation, Wilson's cable to the Council of Workers and So°ldier
Delegates in Russia in 1917 was even more inspiring to the East
Europeans than the Fourteen Points.

In it the President solemnly

stated that,, "We are fighting for no selfish object but for the
liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggression of autocratic
forces.

11

6

In these and many similar pronouncements; the Czech

and Pole and Slovak and Croat - indeed,, people everywhere - heard
it all as a loud and clear recognition by the United States of his
"right of self-determination.

11

It made no difference that England was in general opposition
to the whole idea of a division of Eastern Europe into new small
states,, or that France was holding to the general principle of might
makes right,

7

or that there was strong disagreement within

th~

1.
l

!

the balance of power." The speech also recognized the great
importance of "national aspirations. "
Stephan Bonsal~ Suitors and Supplicants, (New York:
Prentice Hall, 1946 ),, p. 284. The full quotation is, "The day
has come to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can
divide us, we shall be overcome. If we stand together, victory .
is certain and also the liberties which only victory can secure • • .
We are fighting for no selfish object but for the liberation of peoples
everywhere from the aggression of autocratic forces."

6

7

This brief statement of the positions of England and France
is the author's interpretation,. resulting from the study of the
selected bibliography texts.
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United States over the Fourteen Points.

8

What the minority member

knew, was that the President of the land of the free (America), to
which thousands of his family and friends had fled over the last fifty
years, had endorsed th.e principle of self-determination.

By the time

the Paris Conference was convened on January 25, 1919, the combination of the collapse of the empires and the growth of nationalism
in the climate of "self-determination" had turned the mission of the
conference, a.s regards Eastern Europe, from any thoughts of
"should we or should we not 11 to an acceptance of a new order, and
concern only with final shape and understandings.
it was not that easy.

Being in favor

~£political

But, of course,

democracy (self-

determination) still left open the question of economic and social
democracy.

Here then was the problem to ponder i~ Paris - how to

apply the principle of self-determination to Eastern Europe in a way
that gives each new entity a reasonable chance for long life?

CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION AND PRINCIPALS

While the concern of this thesis is only with that part of the
Conference that dealt with the new states of Czechoslovakia and
·Poland and the specific minority problems of each, attention must be
8

A good example of this. United States opinion is found in
a Kansas City Star editorial of November, 1918, written by
Theodore Roosevelt and condemning the whole conciliatory
approach expressed by Wilson.
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given to both the organization of the Conference and a look at the
personal positions held by the three primary personalities: Lloyd

George, Clemenceau, and Wilson.

The early organization of the

Conference was built around a central Council of Ten with representation .from all the "Allied a.nd Principal Powers.

tt

However, for

many logistical, diplomatic, and pragmatic reasons, a Council of
Four (United States, Great Britain, France, Italy) was organized on
or about March 24, 1919, and soon that became an unofficial Council
of Three as Italy stepped back over the debate on her own territorial
interests.

It was this Council of Three - Lloyd George, Clemenceau,

and Wilson - that made the decisions in the minority mafters, and to
whom the seemingly endless pleas of the ttsuitors and suppliants 119
of Eastern Europe were presented.
Who were these men that held the fate of the Eastern
European peoples in their hands-? David Lloyd George, "(1863-1945),
was a skilled parliamentarian and an outstanding war leaderlO
but had no qualifications for the assignment that involved "re modeling the world.

1111

It appears that Lloyd George had three

major handicaps for this role as peace-maker.

First, he was

9 Bonsal, op. cit., p. xi.
1 OE. J. Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference,
(New York: Harper and Bros .. , 1920), p. 62.

11

.
Ibid., p. 62.
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totally tied to Britain's interests as

~

world power. - her colonies,

her markets, and her protective wrappings of sea power and

alliances. Second, he was· an empire advocate, and as such, held
a skeptical view of the whole subject of small nations and "selfdetermination."

The common _quotation used to support this opinion

is his reference to "those miserable nations."

12

His third handicap

was his lack of knowledge of the geography, peoples and history of
Eastern Europe, possibly a reflection

~f

his long standing lack of

.
.
h
13
interest in areas except as empire pat ways.
George Clemenceau of France (1841-1929), commonly known
as "The Tiger,

11

was a Frenchman to the hilt.

hated her enemie.s.

He loved France and

Being personally expert in European power

politics,· he was determined that Germany would never again march
over France, and was equally determined that France was to be the
dominant power on the continent.

The handicap he carried into the

negotiations regarding the new states and the minorities was his
understandable orientation to French power and German contain-

12 Titus Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic,
(London: William Heinewon, Ltd., 1957), p. 275.
From a
Council of Four meeting on May 22, 1919, Lloyd George is
quoted as saying, 11 The Great Powers shall not allow the
small states to use them as cats-paws for their miserable
ambitions."

l 3Dillon, op. cit. , pp. 6 2-66.
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m.ent. 14
Woodrow Wils·on (1856-1924), then President of the United
States, was the complex member of the Council.
there is no agreement.

About Wilson,

Ten historians seem to offer ten opinions,

ranging from humanitarian on the up side, to naive dreamer, and on
down to pure glory-seeker.
presen~

It is not possible for

Wilson as he really was.

~his

thesis to

What can be done is to call

o what Wilson was in the minds of the minorities of
Easterh Europe •. The words of Dr. E. J. Dillon, author, personal
r and c OIIlill.entator on the Peace Conference, vividly
de scribe the \Vils on image:
Never has it fallen my lot to see any mortal
so enthusiastically, so spontaneously welcomed
by the dejected peoples of the uni verse. His most
casual utterances were caught up as oracles. He
occupied a height so far aloft that the vicissitudes
of everyday life and the contingencies of· politics
seemingly could not touch him. He was given
credit for a rare degree of selflessness iri his
·conceptions and actions and for a balance of judgement which no storms of passion could upset • •
Wilson was confronted with an opportunity .for
good incomparable vaster than had ever before
been within the reach of man. 15
14

1t seems ironic that Clemenceau, The Tiger, who was
widely recognized as true blue to French interests., should have
been defeated in the following French elections by a coalition that
criticized him as 11 soft 11 on Germany. See David Lloyd .George,
Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 2 Vol., (New York: Howard
Fertig, 1972), Vol. 2,· pp. 911-12.

15 nnlon, op. cit., p. 90.

While Dr. Dillon 1 ·s de·scription is.
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That Wilson was out of step with the American electorate is well
established.

Evidence of that position is found in his party's defeat

in the 1918. elections, the strong .home front campaign against his
efforts to commit the United States to moral, econonrlc or military
positions, the defeat of the tre·aties in the Congress, and finally,

his defeat in the 1920 presidential election.

However, he was at the

Conference in 1919, and he was the champion of "self-determination.

11

THE DEVELOPING MINORITY CONCERN

It is essential to bear in mind that neither Czechoslovakia nor·
Poland was "created" at the Conference.

Both countries were recog-

nized by the victorious Allie.s as post-war necessities and, via
emigrant and native efforts, formally recognized as national entities
prior to the convening of the Conference.

16

The Conference concern

then, was with the final boundaries of the new states.

The boundary

discussions involved vast numbers of people from many national
nrl.norities.

With the banner of "self-determinationn carried by every

minority group, the Conference concern was _necessarily expanded to
the future of each of the significant minorities.

This led to the

very dramatic, his vivid picture of the Wilson image among the
people of Europe i_s well supported by others.

16 The independence of both countries was proclaimed
before the Conference; Czechoslovakia on October 28., 1918, .and
Poland on November i 1, 1918.
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development of the Minority Treaties.

The treaty story, however,

started with the finalizing of the Czechoslovakian and Polish
boundaries.
The Czechoslovakian boundary decisions centered on two
main areas.

The first was the Bohemian Basin with Prague more or

less at the center.
German population.

In and around this basin lived a large AustrianThere were about 2, 100, 000 Germans in

Bohemia, with a majority in several Bohemian districts, and they
were all about to come under the rule of about 4, 100, 000 Czechs.
The objections of these Austrian-Germans to their pending new
ntlnority status were long and loud and they are presented in detail

in the Lloyd George memoirs.

17

. The heart of the protest was the

flagrant violation of the principl'e of self-determination, carrying
with it the threat of continual conflict.

The requested solution was

for the German majority districts to remain a part of Austria, a
practical impossibility if one checks the geography of the. basin.
The Czech case was presented to the Council by Dr. Edward Benes,
Minister for Foreign Affairs and future President of the Republic,
and is again found in detail in the Lloyd George text.

I.

I

I

The part

of the Czech case relating to the German question was based on

17 Lloyd George,. op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 613-15.

I
I

18

18Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 603-12.
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historic grounds (the restoration of the historic lands of the Crown
of St. Wenceslas that pre-dated the Ge-rman colonization of late:r

centnrie s) as well as on strong economic grounds. It was the latter
contention that prevailed, fo:r the existence of the Bohemian Basin
as an economic entity could ha:rdly be denied.
fully the violation of the bare words,

11

While understanding

self-determination, 11 the

Council recognized the necessary economic modification of that
phrase.

The vote for the hist.oric boundaries was unanimous.

ever, a personal quotation of Lloyd George

is

How-

relevant, albeit in

retrospect:
The result was the recognition of the
polygot and incoherent State of Czechoslovakia,
and the incorporation in the State of hundreds
<>£ thousands of protesti~g Magyars and some
~!lions of angry Germans.
The .angrier they
became the less consideration they got f:rom ·
the Czech government •. Hence the present
trouble. 19
The second major Czechoslovakian boundary problem involved'.
the southern Slovak-Hungarian boundary.

20

As one. moved south in

Slovakia. the Magyar concentration increased# as did Magyar
19
Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 612. These Lloyd George :memoirs
were first published in 1939. The npresent trouble 11 refers to the
Hitler movements of the late 1930s.
20R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp .. 327-28.

There was

a third disputed area on the Polish border. The Duchy of ';reschen
was the subject of considerable Conference discussion. The final
decision created most of the Polish minority listed in Appendix C.

52
domination of the administration of the area.

Still further south

there was a large Slovak population living within the homelands of

Hungary. So where to place the new boundary? Again, ,economics
had to be applied.

The city of Pressburg (Bratislava) on the Danube

was a Magyar city but its hinterland in Slovakia was heavily Slovak.
It was also the only Danube access for the new state.
therefore awarded Bratislava to the Slovaks.

The Conference

Other cities and towns

that were determined to be Magyar, with Hungarian hinterlands,
went to Hungary .. As the boundary decisions progressed, it became
appa~ent

that great numbers of people would, as in Bohemia, necess-

arily come under a political rule hot oft.heir choosing.
In addition to revealing unavoidable exceptions to the principles
of self-determination and nationality, the Czech actions in the various
meetings also started to show some behavior patterns of a minority
turned majority.
get.
11

'rhe Czechs appeared to be out for all they could

This was perhaps most apparent in their claims for a

corridor 11 that would run from Bratislava, south through Hungary,

to St. Gothard on the Yugoslav border.

This was 120 miles long with

perhaps 80% of the populat~on German or Magyar, but deemed a
"strategic, political, and economic necessity.

Zl
u

While the claim

21
Lloyd George, op. cit., p. 603. However, this was not a
claim born of the Conference. Masaryk had seriously discussed
this idea years before as the new state seemed a possibility.
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was rejected, it served notice on the Council that the former minority
was not adverse to extending its new political power over new
m.inoritie s.
In addressing the Polish boundary question, the Council was
powerless to deal with the eastern boundaries at that time.

Those

eastern lands involved Russian areas and Russian policies and had to
await the outcome of the Russian power struggle.

By 1920,. this

tense situation erupted in the Polish-Russian war and a final settlement did not come until 1921.
The German-Polish

boun~ary

discussions saw the Poles

wanting to go as far west as the last home of the last Pole, regardless
of how many Germans were caught in the net.
for exactly the reverse.

II
1·

I

22

The Germans pleaded

The boundary connn.ission of the Counci1

23

tried very hard to come up with a boundary that was based on primary ethnic emphasis, necessarily mo4ified by economics, security,
and tradition.

Unfortunately, the final boundary still left 1, 000, 000

Germans in the new Poland and an estimated 1, 500, 000 Poles in
2

4rhis is not literally true, but one gets this impression from
studying the claims and counterclaims. For a detailed review of thi~
heated boundary debate, see Komarnicki, op. cit., pp. 313-49.
23Edward M. House, Charles Seym~ur, ed., What Really
Happened at Paris, (New York: Charles Scribner 2 s Sons, 1921),
pp. 95-96. The commission consisted of representatives of the
Big Four, two delegates from each country. The European
delegates were professional diplomats and the Americans were
oriented more to fact-finding than diplomacy.
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Germany.
Despite the Ukrainian majority in eastern Galicia, the Poles
claimed

all of Galicia for

the new Poland.

With the fluid Russian

situation, the Poles sought to secure the Galician claim by military
occupation of the area.

This occupation was described by

Paderewski in his presentation to the Council as "not an offensive but
a defensive advance.

n

24

Offensive or defen$ive, this Polish

occupation of Galicia, together with the Council agreement that some
part of Galicia should be returned to Poland, brought about 4, 000, 000
Ukrainians under Polish rule.

25

In setting the boundaries for the new states, the minority
problems became apparent.

Czechoslovakia and Poland existed

but with the necessary sacrifice of self-determination for millions
of their new inhabitants.

This new problem, the rights of the newly

created minorities, was never anticipated at ·the opening of the
Conference, and was complicated by the lack of Conference delegates
that were familiar with these

minorities~

As the weeks went by it

appeared that the new rninoritie s included many threatening
situations.

In Poland, the Germans and Ukrainians were seen as

24Lloyd George, op. ~it., p. 644.
25 The 4, 000, 000 total includes the Ukrainians that were.
in the formerly Russian sectors that came back under Polish rule.
by the Treaty of Riga, signed in 1921 between Pol~nd and the
USSR.
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bitter enemies of the Poles, and the Jews as a distinctly alien
element.

In Czechoslovakia,- the Germans and the Magyars pre-

sented severe hurdles to peace£ul citizenship, while the Ruthenians
had been attached to the new state with the intent of autonomy, not
assimilation.

None of these people wanted new rulers.

Peace Conference that imposed new rule on them.

It was the ·

It was therefore

logical and even required, in the minds ef the conferees, that the
Conference had an obligation to guarantee the minorities certain basic
-rights and privileges.

Totally relying on the goodwill, benevolence,

good intentions, or even future constitutions of the new states was
believed by the Conference to be inadequate.
This mood of re sponsibili~y was fueled by the parade of
special interest delegations that descended on Paris.

In answer to

the self-determination bell, they came from everywhere.

In addition

to the Poles and the Czechs, there were Red and White Russians,
Arabs and Zionists, Montenegrins and their eternal enemies from
Albania; Italians, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians; Ukrainians
and Slovaks.

26

They came to be heard.

From Poland came

Paderewski and Dmowski; from Czechoslovakia came Masaryk,
Bonsal, op. cit. The entire Bonsal text is a ~eview of
this parade, with considerable detail ~n the special pleas~ apparent
motivations, and aspirations. See also John Thomp.son, Russia,
Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1966), and Arnold D. Margolin, Russia, the Ukraine, and
America, (New York: Colun1bia Univ. Press. 1946).
26
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Benes, Stefanik, and the· priest, Father Andrej Hlinka; from
Romania came Ion Bratianu who was to be a leadiri.g minority

spokesman; from Jewish communities came leaders of AngloSaxon, Eastern and Western Europe groups; from the Ukraine came
delegates of Simon Petliura, and there were many more. 2 .7

In one

form or another, they wanted their version of control of their own
destinies.
Points.

Each had found what he wanted in Wilson 1 s Fourteen

Some came in peace.

Some came in fear.

Some came in

obvious search of a chance to dominate their neighbors as they were
once dominated.
They were heard.

Slowly, and by any staff member or princi-

pal that would listen, they were heard.

Unfortunately, there was no

procedure established to produce any action out of the pleas.

No one

at the Conference had any assignment to even listen, let alone

28
recommend.

The awareness of a need for some action was

accelerated by the rapidly passing weeks and approaching deadlines.
Out of this pressure, came the Councii decision to form a
Minorities Committee, chaired by M. Berthelot of France, with
membership from Great Britain, France, and the United States

27lbid., see note 26.
2 BH. W .. V. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference
of Paris, 6 Vol., (London: Institute of Ii:iternational Affairs, 1921),
Vol. 5, p. 123.
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(with Italy and Japan added later).

29

The Committee's function was to bring together the basic
ntlnority concerns, and, recognizing that ·the boundary decisions
would leave most of them unresolved, address those concerns in
the form of a treaty agreement.

These Minority Treaties were to

be between the Allied and Principal Powers and each of the new
states.

30

In addition to a section on purely commercial matters,

the primary section was to spell out the basic citizenship rights of
all bona fide inhabitants of each new state.

It was intended as a

guarantee to each inhabitant that the new state could not adopt new
laws that would leave them out of the new community.

More

positively, it was an attempt to make them a continuing part of the
community.

31

The work proceeded rapidly.

Started in late April,

1919, the treaty draft was presented to the Council on May 14th
and sent to the Polish delegation and government a "few days later.
A similar treaty was drafted for Czechoslovakia and transmitted
shortly thereafter.

29

1bid., p. 124.

30

1n addition to treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland,
similar treaties were required of Yugoslovia and Roma.nia based
on territorie-s assigned by the Conference that included large
ntlnorities.
31

Temperley, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 143.
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AN EXAMINATION OF THE TREATIES

The complete texts of relevant sections .of both the Czechoslovakian and Polish treaties are included as Appendix E and F.
However, a review of the primary articles is a necessary preliminary to the understanding· of the reaction of the new states.

Both

treaties are identical except for the s·pecial sections on Jews in
Poland and on Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia.
Contrary to the views of the new states, the Council did
not consider the treaty as any imposition on the sovereign rights of
the new states.

The Council maintained that it \vas the action of

the Conference that resulted in the transferring of the minority
groups from one rule to another. ·It was therefore both legal and
proper for the Conference to spell out the conditions of that transfer
and make the transfer. subject to acceptance of those conditions.

32

In keeping with this alleged legal basis and objective, the
first Article of the treaty with Poland set up certain stipulations
as "fundamental laws" that were to have precedence over any future
state action.

The second Article as sured all inhabitants of Poland

equal protection of life and liberty.
free exercise of any "creed,
32

A special mention was made of

reli~ion,

Ibid., Vol. 5, Chapter II.
this legal position in detail.

or belief, if not inconsistent

The entire chapter develops
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with public order or public morals."
Article three through six then took up· the matter of the
nationality of the inhabitants.

Everyone that was a "habitual

resident" of the new Polish state as of the treaty date, automatically
became a Polish national.

Everyone that was born of parents that

were "habitual residents 11 became a Polish national even though
the children did not reside in the new state on the treaty date.
Everyone born in Polish territory _became a Polish natic:>nal unless
they were already nationals of some other state.
and options should be noted.

The exceptions

Residents over eighteen years of age

had the option of declaring some other nationality, with the provision that they would move to the state of that nationality within one
year of so declaring.

In such an event, they could retain title to

immovable property, and transfer other property without restriction of duties.

Non-residents could also renounce Polish

nationality within two years of the treaty date.
Article six contained a government guarantee that the
previous nationality options would not be influenced by any government action.

Articles seven and eight recognized that nationals

created by prior stipulations would include people of various races,
languages, and/or religions.

Equality before the law was guaranteed,

as were civil and political rights.

The free. use of any language in

public or private communication was guaranteed as well as the right
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to use such language before the courts.
Education was dealt with in Article nine.

In districts con-

taining a "considerable proporti9n 11 of Polish nationals using a
language other than Polish, primary education was to be offered in
I

the 6ther language.

The government could also make the Polish

language a required subject.

Such mixed districts were also

promised an "equitable share 11 of public funds for educational,
religious, or charitable purposes.

There was an important exception

- - all this applied to Germans only if they were residents of those
·areas that were German territory on August 1, 1914.

33

Articles ten and eleven contained special provisions
regarding Jews.

Local educational committees appointed by the

Jewish comn1unity were to receive a proportional share of public
funds for the support of Jewish schools.

The Hebrew religion·

received special consideration as the Jewish Sabbath was exempted
from any legal business, attendance in courts, or general or local
elections.
In Article twelve, Poland agreed that all of tl1e treaty
stipulations affecting racial, religious, or linguistic minorities,
were matters of international concern to be placed under the guarantee

33It was argued that the many German residents of the
eastern areas, and those that followed the troops during the war,
deserved no special attention.
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of the Council of the League of Nations.

Only the League Assembly

could modify the stipulations, and the major powers agreed to
approve any modification agreed to by a ·majority of the League
Council.

Poland acknowledged the right of any Council member to

bring before the Council any actual or threatening infraction of the
stipulations.

Any dispute arising out of such a presentation was to

go for resolution to.the Court of ·International Justice in The Hague.
The treaty with Czechoslovakia deleted. the Articles referring
to Jewish considerations.
regarding Ruthenia.

It added, however, special provisions

The Ruthenians were as sured of autonomous

treatment, consistent with unity of the state.

They were to have

their own Diet with full local powers, local Ruthenian .officials
"wherever possible,
slovakian Diet.

u

and equitable representation in the Czecho-

The only other difference in the treaties was "-

change in the educational commitment.

Poland limited the minority

language commitment to primary schools, while the Czechoslovakian
version deleted the primary school reference and so applied the
minority language rule to all public education.

There is soine

speculation over the reasons for not making special provisions
regarding the very large and powerful German :minority in the Czech
lands.

The cited Temperley text reveals no record of special

committee consideration.

Temperley suggests that, first, the

general provisions did the job, and that the problem was so .funda-

6Z
:mental to ongoing Czech affairs that it was best to place maximum
responsibility on the government itself.

34

TREATY OPPOSITION .AND DEFENSE

Drafts of the treaties were forwarded to the new governments
of Czechoslovakia and Poland in mid-May, 1919.
Cze·choslovakia was almost ·the opposite of Poland.
serious Czech opposition

w~s

The position of
Very little

raised against the treaty, perhaps

because the Czechs and Slovaks had what they came for, a new state,
with "historic" boundaries.

Their readiness to sign the treaty

stem.med from several other sources as well.
that led the campaign for the new state.

It was the Czechs

They had a cadre of

qualified political, educational, and intellectual leaders, starting
with Thomas Masaryk and Ed\Yard Benes.

Those Czech leaders had

an immediate problem of unity with Slovakia, with whom there were
great differences in culture, education, and the trappings of leadership.

35

In. the east, the Czech leaders had no disagreement with the

logic and necessity for special treatment of the Ruthenians.
Czech lands were the Germans, a problem so large and so

In the
vi~al

that

3 4Temperley, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 146.
35 R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 323. The Magyars had
completely dominated the administration of Slovakia. In pre-war
years, less than 2% of adrllinistrative posts were held by Slovakidentified persons.
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the Czechs were impressed by its omission from the treaty, taking

it as a vote of confidence that the Czechs could handle the German
factor themselves.· What was there to -disagree with?
got· their new
question.

stat~.

Bias?

They

Equity? They never seemed to raise the

Sovereignty? Theirs was a new state.

posite of historic lands out of a dead empire.
leadership, resources, and an opportunity.
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was apparently good enough for them.

It was a com-

The Czechs had
The combination

The Poles, on the other hand,

immediately raised questions of sovereignty, assimilation, and
legality.

The re developed, ace ordingly, an active de bate that built

up to a :formal opposition by the Poles at the, l.J:ay 31st Plenary
Session of the Supreme Council of the Conference.
The Polish case was argued by Paderewski.

His attack

revolved around three main points: his feelings regarding the bias
of the three principal members of the Council, his view of equity,·
and the question of sovereignty.

In claiming a Council bias,

Paderewski referred to the British interests in maintaining an
active Germany, which led to Lloyd George's siding with German
interests in both Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Clemenceau, as seen

by Paderewski, looked upon Poland only as a buffer between Germany

.
36Temperley, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 470. By February, 1920,
Czechoslovakia had enacted its own Language Law (Appe1:1dix G) that
went well beyond the Minority Treaty in detailing minority language
and educational rights.
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and Soviet Russia, while Wilson, the champion of self-determination,
came under suspicion of bias as he reverted to

of right 11 on one occasion.

11

might is the source

37

The perception of equity played a major part in the Polish
case against the treaty.

As a new sovereign state, Poland's

position seemed simple and proper.
applied to all states.

What rules?

Poland wanted the same rules
Basically, the principle of sel!-

determination and the rights of minorities as spelled out in the
Minority Treaty.

Evidence of the great difference between the ex-

pressed desire of the Allied Powers for minority rights in the new
states and the same rights in their own countries may be found in
the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The original

draft of the Covenant, prepared by _Wilson, included ari Article that
recognized the probable future need for "te·rritorial readjustment.s .
•

•

o

by reason of changes in racial conditions and aspirations or

social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of selfdetermination.

u

38

It made such territorial readjustments subject

to a Delegate vote and it bound the Powers to "accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in

37

Temperley, · op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 130. The cited occasion
was Wilson's speech to the Plenary Session of the Supreme Council
on May 31, 1 91 9.

38Lansing, op. cit., p. 93.

65
importance to every question of political jurisdiction

~r

boundary.

1139

Before presentation to the Commission on the League, the draft was
revised into a simple guaranty to

11

respect and preserve the terri-·

torial integrity and existing political independence of all Members. 1 ,40
In that form, without any references to self-determination or changes
in racial conditions or aspirations, it went into the Treaty of Peace.
The opinion was expressed by Robe rt Lansing, Wilson 1 s Secretary of
State, that the drastic revision was directly due to objections raised

41
by the British Empire with a view toward their far-flung territories.
In spite of the Covenant revision, Wilson continued to promote the
self-det"!rmination principle and the credibility gap, in the minds of
the Poles, grew wider by the week.
The equity

objection~

did not deal only with general principles.

In two specific situations, the Poles alleged a gross inequity.

First

was the German minority in Poland that was about to come under the
protection of the treaty, although the many Poles in Germany were
given no such guarantees.

In a Council meeting on the subject on

June 17th, Wilson agreed with the Polish objections and stated,
"It was a serious indictment that we were claiming more for the

39

Ibid., p. 93.

4 oibid. , p. 94.
41

Ibid., pp. 94-95.
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·Germans in Poland than for the Poles in Germany.

1142

The Jewish problem produced the second claim of inequity.
The Polish view was centered on the citizenship of the Jew, claiming
the Jew was a Polish citizen, should be treated like one, and should
act like one.

However, substantial outside pressures were present

from British and American JeWish groups.

These groups gave wide

publicity to many anti-Semitic incidents occurring during the war
years.

Pointing to these incidents, they held to the general

position that the Jews of Poland, based on Polish actions in recent
times, must receive special consideration, above and beyond that
accorded other residents.

43

Whiie the American and British

Jewish interests were pushing hard for Jewish privileges, Wilson
and Lloyd George were skeptical.

Wilson expressed concern ·over

"imparting to the Jews a corporate capacity

1144 and Lloyd George

agreed that Jewish school separation would

11

tend to create a

separate nation of Jews in Poland rather than unity.

11

45

Paderewski

reminded the Council. that the Polish partitions, which all the
. Allied Powers had denounced, wer·e partially justified at that time

42K omarn1c
. k"1, op. cit., p. 293.
43

Temperley, op. cit., pp. 122-23.

44K omarn1c
. k.1, op. cit., p. 293.
45

Ibid.

I

P• 293.
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on grounds of religious minority protection, a historic remembrance
that made the Poles nervous when viewing the Jewish demands.

4

~

The !inal treaty Articles were an acceptance of the need for some
special Jewish consideration, but far short of Jewish demands.

Still,

the mere mention of the problem in the Polish treaty alone, placed
a certain anti-Semitic onus on the Poles that was not so placed on
the other new states and territory assignments.
Bias and equity were major factors, but sovereignty was the
core of the Polish opposition to the treaty.

In the opinion of the Poles,

as a sovereign state Poland had the same status as all other states.
The Minority Treaty, not required of all states, was a major infringement on that sovereignty.

The provision for special treatment of

nationals, not required of all states, was a further infringement.
Above all, however, the provision for the review of treaty infractions,
or even threatened infractions, by the League of Nations upon the
complaint of any member of the League, was the bitter pill that
Polish leaders swallowed very reluctantly.

It was the Polish con-

tention that the presence of this external court of appeal would produce perpetual alienation of the minorities.

In the opinion of the

Poles, national harmony would never be achieved as long as alleged
grievances could be routed to outside interests, circumventing

46 Ibid.", p. 293.
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Polish law and p.rocedures.

More important than the objections of

practice and procedure was the basic conte.ntion that one sovereign
League member could not be subjected to rules non-applicable to the
others.

That, said the Poles,. was a denial of sovereignty, pure and

.
47
simple.
The Council response

t~

the Polish treaty objections was

-covered by Wilson's speech to the Plenary Session on May 31st, and
by Clemenceau 1 s transmittal letter that was sent with the treaty; to

Poland.

48

Of major concern to the Council was the fact that

n~illions

of people were being transferred from one political rule to another
without their consent.

Since the self-determination banner was still

flying over the Council chambers, a reconciliation of Council·intentions and actions was imperative.
Briefly, the Council had no alternative.

There does not

appear to be any record of any alternate boundary decisions that
might have been made that would have substantially eliminated
this minority problem.

Mass re settlement of populations or

creation of additional states was not considered as a viable

This is a su~mation of Polish opinion.s as presented
in Temperley, op. cit., pp. 141-142, and Komarnicki, op. cit.,
pp. 2 91 - 301.
47

48

Ibid. The Wilson text is found on pp. 130-32 and the
Clemenceau text on pp. 432-38.
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choice. 4 9

The new Poland was a fact.

The need for ·a basic economic

and social structure of the new Poland was essential.

The resulting

intermingling of the populations and the intertwining of economic
interests created a Gordian knot.
compromise.

The solution, therefore, was a

The compromise formed both Poland and the new

ntlnoritie s.
As a creator is responsible for his creations, so the Council
was responsible for the welfare of the new minorities, and the new
position of some old minorities.
did not create the new states.

It has been noted that the Conference

The war was the creative catalyst,

and the Allied Powers (Britain, France, United States) would be
required to keep the peace.
its case.

From the war's ruins, the Council built

It was by Allied Power action that Poland was born and

populated.

It was regrettable, but unavoidable, that the new

population included large numbers of people to whom the rule of
self-determination was being denied.

The Minority Treaty became

the substitute for self-determination, establishing the minority
rights as

11

fundamental laws 11 to take precedence over any future

4 9on the question of mass transfers of populations,
such as between Greece and Bulgaria at the close of World War I,
and the transfers after World War II, the author could not find
any evidence that the Conference ever considered such action
as applicable to either Czechoslovakia or _Poland.
It seems
likely that any mass transfer. would have been involuntary a_nd
thus a violation of self-determination.
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action of the new state.

As such, the Treaty was meeting a Con-

ference obligation that was an integral part of the act of creation.
On the specific question of equity, the Council 1 s position
was never officially stated, but was unofficially obvious.
Conference was not convened to re-make the entire world.

The Paris
It was

called to conclude a peace with the defeated Central Powers that
included new arrangements for certain areas previously under
Central Power control.

By no stretch of the imagination, did the

Conference have either authority or intention of setting up behavioral
-rules and regulations that would also apply to American Blacks or
Catholics of Northern Ireland, or Basques of Spain, or any other
existing state's problems.

Accepting the idea of world-wide enforce-

ment of the principles involved in the ·Minority Treaties was out of
-order..

However, the inability to accomplish a total task does not

obviate the need to get started with a solution.

Technical and

admitted inequity was not an acceptable reason for inaction, a
position understood by the Czechs and either not understood or
ignored by the Poles.
Sovereignty was the remaining question.
Nations was not set up as any guarantor of

11

f ree or constitutional

government ·or guaranteeing liberties of any kind.

SOTemperley, op. cit.,, p. 140.

The League of

11

50

Its basic
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function was to guarantee the provisions of certain treaties
entrusted to the League by mutual consent of the covered states.
'l:his was not the usurpation of sovereignty but rather the carrying
out of an.assigned task.

The Polish contention was that the

minorities would view the Le.ague as their sanctuary, 'to the ex.clusion of the Polish government, perpetuating particularism,
not unity.

The Council counter was the contention that the knowledge

of the existence of an independent jurisdiction would allay early
fears and promote eventual unity. ·
The objections of the Polish Delegation did result in a
number of modifications in the original draft.

The Treaty· Com-

·.mittee also revised certain wording,. but in the main, the original
principles were urigidly adhered to.

51
u

On June 28, 1·919, the

Minority Treaty with Poland was signed at Versailles.

On September

10, 1919, the Minority Treaty with Czechoslovakia was signed at
Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

Many men had labored long to bring

about a new order of things in Eastern Europe.

New states were

recognized that did follow primary nationality lines.

Most of the

people of Eastern Europe were under a rule of their own choosing.
The new minorities had their rights spelled out in treaty form, the
first such detailed written guarantees in the history of western

51 Ibid. , · p. 132.
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civilization.

52

How effective the new minority rights proved to be

is the subject of the next chapter.
52 There have been many prior mentions of minority religious
and political rights but nothing that compares with the detail of the
Minority Treaties and the fact that the treaties were sponsored by
all the Allied Powers.

i
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CHAPTER IV

MINORITY RIGHTS: ACTIONS AND RESULTS

The minorities of the new states presented major problems
to the new rulers.

The Minority Treaties, in recognizing these

problems, detailed certain basic minority rights and set up a
'1

specific procedure for minority grievances.

The leaders of both

'

·:

I

Czechoslovakia and Poland proclaimed the intentions of the new
states to honor minority rights, with or without the treaties.

With

the problems recognized, and with treaties and good intentions
guarding the minority rights, what was the relationship between

tl~.e

-rulers and the ruled in the years between the two World Wars?

THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINORITIES: 1919-1938

The Czechs and Slovaks debated the proper description of
the new state from its very beginnings.

Was the state a "national
1

state" or was it a "state of nationalities? 11
1

Early legislation

Both Benes and Masaryk accepted the "state of
nationalities" description.
Speaking of the new states of
Eastern Europe~ Benes stated, "It was not possible to form
these • • • states as if they were national states; it was not
possible to • • . exclude from them all minorities." See
HCR, op. cit;, pp. 176-77.

l

I
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confirmed the· latter designation.

The Constitution of 1920 in-

corporated all the provisions of the Minority Treaty and was

regarded ci:t a "thoroughly liberal constitution following Western
·models."

2

A "Language Law" was enacted in February, 1920

(Appendix G).

The law designated Czech and Slovak languages as

offic:rial tongues, and specifically provided for complete commercial,
public, and legal use of minority languages in all districts having a
racial minority of at least 20%.

The law also specified the "mother-

tongue" for all instruction in all minority schools; it was, in fact, a
strong extension of the Minority Treaty.
But while the Constitution and the Language Law established
legal and leadership concern for the minorities in Czechoslovakia,
· that concern wa·s neither shared nor accepted by the population at
large.

3

According to one observer of the scene, the bureaucracy

"frequently behaved as if the State had been created for Staatvolk
only and that all others were to get what was left over."

4

This

review of Czechoslovak and Polish minorities will pay attention to

both the spirit and the letter of the laws, as well as to the following

2

Ibid., p. 173.

3

on the political front, the National Democrats, headed by
Karel Kramar, a strong anti-Bolshevik and political opponent of
Masaryk, promoted the 11 National State" concept.
See Hugh
Seton-Watson, -op. cit., p. 1 73.
4HCR, op. cit., p. 177.

,
I
~
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·questions.

How did the minorities fare under the new rule -

politically, culturally, and economically? Also, and perhaps the

m.ost important of all, what were the attitudes of the minoritie·s
toward the new rulers?

The Czechoslovak Germans

5

In the Czech lands of Bohemia-Moravia, the 1921 census
showed the Germans were almost one-third of the population.

6

They

were the former rulers of the land and the leaders of industry and
administration.
State.

11

7

They exercised a "dominating influence in the

After reviewing the prominent German position, the

Conference Committee on New States

determin~d

that, "It is clear

that the prospects and perhaps almost the existence of the new State
will depend on the success with which it incorporates the Germans

as willing citizens.

11

8

Politics came first.

Things got off to a bad start when the

Czechoslovak National Assembly started the draft of the new

5Note the change in reference from "Germans in
Czechoslovakia" to nczech-Germans 11 and the similar use for
the other minorities.
This is not a description of what was,
only of what was the hope of many.

6 see Appendix C ior exact £igU:res and concentrations.
7

HCR, op. cit., p. 172.

8

Ibid., p. 173.
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constitution.

The Assembly was made up entirely of Czechs and

Slovaks; no Germans, Magyars, or Ruthenians were included.

In

.spite o:f the agreed liberal nature 0£ the constitution, the excluded
groups could, and did, claim discrimination.

When the first elected

parliament convened in May, 1920, all of the several newly formed
German parties were -in opposition to the government.

However,

only the German Nationalists looked to separation while the rest of
the parties pressed for various degrees of autonomy within the State.
Working within the State framework, Germans assumed influential
government posts within a few years.

By 1926, Germans held the

ministries of public works and justice and in 1929, the Ministry of
Social Welfare.

Throughout the civil service, they did not do too

well, but for predictable reasons.

A trait of the bureaucracy as well.

as individuals was, and still is, to flock together, to appoint your
own kind, and so the Czechs appointed Czechs.
reason was the language problem.

.

A more defendable

9

Few Germans spoke Czech while

most Czechs spoke German and bi-lingual ability was a civil service
asset.

In spite 0£ problems of representation and civil.service,
German voters appeared to demonstrate a preference for working
9

use of the term 11 defendable" does imply an undesirability
of the human tendency to "flock together. 11 The tendency is a
fact. Whether or not it is undesirable will be left up to the reader's
personal opinion.
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for a better voice within the state.
apparently in the minority.

Irredentist tendencies were

Using the Czechoslovak Statistical

Yearbook, J. S. Bruegel, a British historian and author, divided
the German parties into "activists" (working for participation) and
"negativists"(working for separation). The elections of 1920, 1925,
.
10
and 1929 all showed a 75% or better activist majority.
1933.

Then came

As Adolph Hitler .came to power, in the Weimar Republic,

so did an obscure teacher by the name of Konrad Henlein in
11

Czechoslovakia.

Riding a tidal wave of German national

fanaticism, Henlein formed the

Sudete~

German Party.

The pro-

claimed party goal was autonomy for Sudeten Germans, not
secession.

However, as Hitler became more aggressive, so did

the Sudeten German Party.

Entering the 1935 elections and clearly

classed as "negativist," the Sudeten German Party polled ab.out 70%
of the German vote, a direct reversal of prior years' results.
Statistically and politically speaking, Czech-Germans up to 1933
worked towards a better position with the Czechoslovak state.

The

sudden support of Henlein, however, indicates the possibility that the
cooperative attitude prior to 1933 reflected resignation to the best

l OHCR, op. cit. , p. 1 79.
11

R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 351-54. These
pages detail the background and rise of Henlein and his Sudeten
party. See also the Bruegel study, HCR, op. cit., pp. 182-

183.

1
~

I
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available situation, rather than acceptance.

.

The Language L_aw strongly re-enforced the Minority Treaty

l

in the area of education.

Bruegel has made some descriptive com-

parisons between Czech-Slovak schools, German schools in Czechoslovakia, and German schools in Germany.

12

It shows the Czech-

German schools were superior.to schools in Germany and the equal
of Czech-Slovak
as the .statistic.

schools~

using

11

pupils per class and per teacher"

Further support is found in higher education where

Germans received a more than proportionate share of Czechoslovakia' s higher education budget.

13

On the economic side, the German in Czech lands started
with a prominent position in state administration,
agriculture.

industry, and

He might have had cultural or political ties to Germany

or Austria but his economic interests ran to the Czech markets.

The

German position in the private economic sector simply rose or fell
with the economic fortunes of the state.

Those fortunes had a

difficult time in the first few years as the industry of the new state
had to adjust to a changing market-place.

14

Things improved i11 the

later 1920s, only to crash with the rest of the world in the Great

12HCR, op. cit., pp • .184-85.
13
Ibid. , p. 184.
14
The primary pre-war markets of Bohemia were Germany and
Austria -- both were severely reduced in the early post-war years.
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Depression.

No evidence of economic discrimination is found in the

statistics of the depression years.

From 1930 to 1935, the govern-

ment made unemployment payments to German trade unions in
greater per worker amounts than to the Czech and Slovak unions,
due to a higher wage structure of the German areas.

Also, special

relief in kind was nearly equal in total value and favored the

. per cap1•t a grants. 15
G ermans in
The Czechs kept the political, cultural, and economic roads
open for the German minority.

.
16
their new minority status?

What did the Germans think about
While some Czechs will look back and

see only a paradise of offered love and affection, a German loyalist
will view the same scene and report exactly the r'everse.

17

Where

does the truth lie? Part of the truth remains hidden beneath the

l SHCR, op. cit. , p. 186.

16

Remember that the Czech-Germans were always a statistical minority in the Czech lands, even though a political and
economic majority in the pre-war years. Also note that these
Germans were never part of the German empire. Their background
and fortunes had been tied to the Austrian empire.

17

The Slavonic Review, Vol. 14, pp. 295-320. This periodical
contains an excellent example of these contrasting views. Following
the Henlein victory in the 1935 elections, the Review editors solicitied.
opinions on the Czech-German minority situation. The German view
is by a German Bohemian Deputy and a leader of the Sudeten German
party. The Czech view is by a Dr. Emil Sobota, prominent in Czech
politics. The German literally tears the alleged Czech benevolence
apart, citing numerous statistical "proofs." The Czech admits a
problem but alleges the problem stems from German unwillingness
to use the offered opportunities.
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debris of the Great Depression and the boots of the Nazi Stormtroopers.

The truth may also lie in t_he opinion of Dr. Otto Lechner,

a· Czech industrialist and political writer, when he stated, "The
treatment of the minorities in our country was good - it could have
been better. "

Th~

18

Czechoslovak Magyars
There was no such thing! As with the Germans, the Magyars

went from rulers to ruled.

As rulers, the pre-war Magyars in

Slovakia controlled the channels of government, commerce, education,

a~d

culture.

19

With the change in status, some Magyars refused to

serve the new masters and withdrew to the newly-shaped Hungary.
The 1921 census shows that about 750, 000 stayed on.

20

Initial Magyar reaction to the new rule was antagonistic.
t:

While Magyars were not invited to the initial Constituent National
l 8~CR, op. cit. , p. 187. The quotation is from Lee hner' s
book, As We Saw It in Prague, (London: 1942), p. 116.

19

C. A. Macartney, Hungary and-Her Successors, (London:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1937), p. 91. Macartney suggests that the
Magyarization of Slovakia was not necessa·rily a on·e-way street.
He stated, 11 'Ihe denial of national culture is only opl>ressi ve when
it is felt to be oppressive. tr The Slovak could see great advantages
in joining the Magyar society and did so in great numbers.
20 with the re-settlement of the Germans, the extermination
or emigration of the Jews, and the transfer of Ruthenia to the
USSR, the Magyars are the only significant minority remaining in
Czechoslovakia today.
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. Assembly (to form the new constitution), it is the opinion of C. A.
Macartney, eminent scholar and authority on Eastern Europe, that

the Magyars would not have attended even if invited.

21

The new

Constitution extended full political rights to all nationalities.

The

basic rights of party formation, secret ballot, and freedom of
political expression were all

e~tended

to the Magyars, and gradually,

they did avail themselves of these :r;ights.

Freedom of vote, speech,

and movement, however, does not necessarily. produce political
By a system. of Czechoslovak gerry-mand~ring, districts

.results.

w:ere arranged to reduce concentrations of Magyar votes.

In certain

Magyar-controlled cities, the burgomaster was appointed by the
government instead of elected as in the non-Magyar cities.

zz

The

sum total of all this was political freedom but no political power.
The Language Law of 1920 has been generallr regarded as a
very positive step towards minority rights.
find some interesting applications.
21

In Slovakia, one can

The Magyar language was

Macartney, op. cit., p. 152.
While Macartney is
cited in this case and in a number of following instances, he is
considered to be a leading authority on the Magyars ~nd
their lands.
The reader is referred to the previously cited
texts by R. W. Seton-Watson for additional support of the
Macartney citations ..
22Ibid. , P· 153.
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dominant in many regions of Slovakia.

23

This was the result of

·generations of controlled education and the obvious commercial

advantage, or even requirement, of speaking Magyar.

Official

c-0unts on which the 20 percent rule would be applied, were based on
11

stated nationality," not language.

Thus, the large number of

Magyar-speaking Germans, Jews, or Slovaks were linguistically not
counted.

By this system, one ·could be in a community with almost

total Magyar tongue used in public places and still be faced with
nothing but Czech-Slovak signs and legal language.

24

Closely tied to politics and language were the matters of
justice and the civil service.

As to justice, it is· agreed that the

25
linguistic privileges of all minorities were "scrupulously observed"
as was the Constitutional guarantee of equality before the law.

The

civil service presented a situation somewhat different from the CzechGerman result.

The decline in Magyar posts was very great.

Many Magyars either refused to serve, or were so openly hostile

2311 Dominant" in this case refers to the language of the
educated and commercial society. Among the p~asant families
(the majority of the Slovak population), the Slovak lan~u~ge
lived on.
See R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in
Hungary,
(New Yorjc: Howard Fertig, 1972), p.· .437, for detailed
statistics on the Magyar dominance of Slovak education. Hereafter
cited as R WSW.
24Macartney, op.; cit.·, p. 157.

25

Ibid. , p. i

ss.

i

J
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as to require their release.

26

These vacancies were initially filled

by Czechs for there was no Slovak cadre of eligible public servants.

Czechs in Bohemia surely sensed the need for living with the
Germans, but it is probable that the Czech in Slovakia, faced with
an angry Magyar and an unhappy Slovak, countered in kind.
The Czechs had two major educational tasks in Slovakia: to
raise the literacy level of the Slovaks, and to provide proper educational opportunities for the minorities.

They accomplished both.

The minority position was well stated by Macartney,

11

The position

·for all minorities is most satisfactory as regards elementary
e<:Iucation, where a genuine effort seems to be made to ensure that
every child is instructed in its mother-tongue. "

27

Supporting this

statement are school statistics showing proportionate treatment of
Slovak, Magyar, and German schools. 28

Macartney also com-

mends the division of public funds for education.

While the Czech

administration made Magyar education proportionally and linguistic ally correct, the fact remained that the actual number of Magyar

26

Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two
World Wars, (Seattle: Univ. of W~shington Press,· 1974), p. 119.
Also see R. W. Seton~Watson, op. cit. p. 323. .The Magyar
civil service decline was estimated at 60%, about twice as severe
as among the Czech-Germans.

27 Macartney, op. cit., p. 166.
28Ibid. , p. 174.

l
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schools was reduced.

From a total Magyar dominance of education,

the Magyars went to proportionate sharing with all the other national

groups.
Slovakia was an agrarian and semi-mountainous country.
The principal land holdings belonged to the ruling Magyars, many
· of whom returned to Hungary.

Their exodus facilitated land re -

form, meaning the expropriation of Magyar lands.

It has been

estimated that 80% of the expropriated land was Magyar owned,
while over 90% of the re-distribution was to non-Magyars (Slovaks
and Czechs).

The new land was also ncolonizedn in strategic areas

by Czechs and Slovaks in order to reduce Magyar concentrations.

It has been alleged that such colonizing was deliberately aimed at
any possible future boundary revision by establishing ethnographic

.

c 1aims.

29
A shift in financial institutions from Magyars and Jews to

Slovaks and Czechs was inevitable, but in trade and industry, there
was far less disturbance.

Geography again

entere~

ta.ti on of Slovakia is to the south, to Hungary.

Th~

in..

The orien-

mountains, the

rivers, the downhill run to the Danubian Plain makes it so.

The

Magyars stood astride the channels of commerce, along with the

29Ihid., p. 174. Macartney is very sure of the. Czech motive
- to break up Magyar majorities. This policy was referred to in
note 38, Chapter II.

.

l
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Magyarized .Jews.

These owners were in a much better position to

continue the southerly trade than any Czech replacements (and there
were few Slovaks replacements _available).

The problem, however,

was more in the lack of volume than the direction.

An increasing

population (the result of high birth rates and reduced emigrations),
the geographically difficult east-west trade, and the diminishing
Hungarian market added up to ip.creasing hardships for all of
Slovakia.

Economic troubles were accelerated by an agricultural

depression in 1927 that in turn touche·d off .a Czech policy of autarky.
'J:'.he policy was to have the agrarian Slovakia-Ruthenia balance
.:the more industrial Czech lands.

An immediate result was the

severing of Slovak-Hungarian trade, the very life-blood of Slovak
economy.

30

The markets of the Czech lands were not sufficient to

make up the disruption, resulting in severe unemployment.

Ironically,

the Magyar workers were somewhat less affected than the Slovaks,
as the Magyars were .not only the more skilled workers but also had
the advantage of working for Magyar employers.

The

economi~

.

. problems faced by the Magyars were related more to the deteriorating economy than to discrimination •
.Budapest is less than fifty miles from the Slovak border.
The Magyars in Slovakia had been rulers for 1, 000 years and were
30

'
By 19 31, exports to Hungary and imports from Hungary
has both dropped to less than 20% of the 1929 level.
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not about to change in a decade or so.

Most Magyars, from manager

to peasant, were technically as well off under Czech rule as under

the rigid Hungarian system .. But old loyalties die hard.

The Magyar

perception of Czech rule paid attention more to the loss of authority
than to the acquisition of new opportunity, a reaction similar to that
of the Germaµs.

Human nature seems to be the culprit.

that not everyone yearns for authority.

It .may be

However, almost everyone,

once accustomed to the possession and use of authority, gives it ·up
very .reluctantly.

Treaty rights and Czech actions to the contrary,

a secret ballot plebiscite on return to Hungary would have drawn,
in 1935, a vast majority of Czech-Magyar votes.
the Magyar

ir~edenta,

31

The problem,

had hardly been dented.

The Czechoslovak Ruthenians
The evaluation of any position must give. attention to past
progress as well as present weakness and so it must be in Ruthenia.
Under Magyar domination for centuries, the 1919 population of
Ruthenia was still identified as two-thirds Ruthenian.

The Ruthenians

were essentially mountain-peasants, illiterate, and, in some

opinions~

on the verge of total assimilation into Magyar nationality.

31 Macartney, op. cit., p. 183. It is Macartney'·S opin_ion
that the pro-Hungarian vote might have been 90%.
32 R.. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 324.

32
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But Ruthenian nationalism was still alive.
specified an autonomous government.

The Minority Treaty

Ruthenia was to have its own

Diet, control of its own local affairs, local Ruthenian officials, and
representation in the Czecho-Slovak Diet in Prague.
There is considerable criticism of the Czech failure to
proceed with these political pr.ovisions.

By 1935, there was no

Ruthenian Diet or anything approaching autonomy.
a pragmatic reply.

The Czechs had

In view of the unsettled conditions among the

neighbors, any autonomous arrangement would qe very vulnerable
t.o demagogic or just plain

incomp~tent

leadership.

33

To this

leadership concern, a more political motive was added.

Ruthenia ,

was logica.µy a part of either Hungary or a new Ukrainian state.
Early autonomy thus carried the danger of early separation.

The

Czech alternative was to provide a body of Czec.h le.adership, as
was done in SlC?vakia, partly for control and partly out of sheer
~

necessity.

Under that controlled leadership, the Czechs started·

active economic and cultural programs that were aimed at a
society that could run itself, and remain loyal to the new state.
Macartney' s observations regarding this Czech administration are

33

while this is a familiar objection of entrenched power
viewing a newcomer, the accepted high quality of Czech
leadership gives credence to the Claim~
See Hugh Seton-Watson,
op. cit., p. 181.

l
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very descriptive.
India.

34

He likens the rule to that of the British in

He tells of Czech official quarters, clubs, shops, social

networks,· and of a Czech feeling of being on foreign duty, with the
Ruthenians being the "natives." He also describes the Czech
officials as "intelligent, honest, and devoted.

ri

35

The quality and

the intentions of the Czech leadership were well above any previous
Ruthenian experience.

The Czechs also invested major funds in

everything from roads to communications, to. public .health and
education.

Although the Treaty provisions for autonomy were not

followed, the Czechs contended they were building the foundation
for autonomy.
Education was a major requirement •. Owing to the isolation
and habits of rural life as well as the complete Magyarization of the
schools, illiteracy was widespread.
basic choice of language.

The first hurdle was the very

A new Ruthenian school might logical.ly .use

Great Russian, Ukrainian, or a local dialect.
fusion and the result was a little of everything.
schools were built.

Confusion bred conMeanwhile, the

Within ten years, Ruthenia progressed from

600 schools and 1, 000 teachers to 800 schools .and 2, 700 teachers,
34Macartney, op. cit.,· pp. 225-28.
On' this subject of
Ruthenia, historians, including the renowned R. W. Seton-Watson,
accept Macartney as the leading authority due to his personal contacts with the land and the people.

35

.

Ibid. , p. 227.

89
proportioned among the Ruthenians, Magyars, Germans, and Jews.

36

The many Czech schools were also heavily attended by the Jewish
minority in preference to the linguistically confused Ruthenian
schools.

37

The educational effort" resulted in a major rise in

literacy and in the cultural level of Ruthenia.
The familiar problems of the land-oriented society were
present in Ruthenia.

Serious qverpopulation resulted from the

combination of a high birth rate, restricted emigration, and an
agrarian economy that employed almost 70% of the working popu-

l~tion. 38

A further complication was the loss of the Hungarian mar-

kets that followed the 1927 Czech policy of autarky.
problems, the Cze.chs worked at improvements.

In spite of the

The Magyar and

the Jew had control of pre-war Ruthenian commerce.

To get the

Ruthenians into conµn.ercial activity, the Czechs assisted the development of Ruthenian commodity and credit cooperatives, as well as
establishing a new Ruthenian bank group.

39

The record gives the Czechs generally good marks for their
36

Slavonic Review, Vol. 13, p. 3~7. Because statistics vary
according to the statistician's rules, the quoted figures are approximations that are verified in other texts.
·
37

Ihid.

I

P· 278.

38

Ibid., p •. 3 76.

39

~, p. 376. From almost nothing in 1920, ten years saw
over 400 cooperative branches in both credit and commodity fields.
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minority efforts in Ruthenia.

What did the Ruthenians think? The

Ruthenians who were aware of the autonomy provisions of the Treaty

were disappointed. Those who compared life under the Czechs with
.life under the Magyars were pleased.

However, the Ruthenian who

lost his job with the loss of Hungarian markets was doubtless angry.
-~

The basic ingredients of a successful union with Czechoslovakia
were present, given the time necessary to make it all work.

40

The Czechoslovak Jews
The pre-war Jewish minority in Slovakia. and Ruthenia was
closely allied with the ruling Magyars, and with the ruling AustrianGermans in the Czech lands.

As the Czechs took control of the

government in all provinces, they welcomed support from any nonMagyar or non-German, the Jews in particular.

Under Czech rule,

the Jews enJoyed freedom of both religion and opportunity and became
strong supporters of the new state.

The pre-war ill-feeling toward

the Jews that was found in Slovakia and Ruthenia seemed to .disappear
as the Slovaks and Ruthenians now saw the Jews somewhat more as
citizens of the new state than as part of a Magyar ruling group.

The

special problems presented by the Jewish minority - the danger of
anti-Semitism and the use of Jewish talent - were well on the road
40

Note that Ruthenia was annexed by the USSR in. 1945 as
part of the re-alignment of Eastern Europe.
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toward solution.
Overall, how did the Czechs meet their minority obligations?

All the cited texts indicate that they deserve high marks for
observing the letter of the law.

Before commenting on the spirit of

the law, a reminder of the Czech situation is in order.

The two

dominant groups of pre-war central and eastern Europe were the
Germans and the Magyars.
of them.
lands.

Czechoslovakia had to contend with both

The Czechs also had the talent and desire to rule their own

During generations of being ruled by qermans and Magyars,

the Czechs and Slovaks developed no love for these rulers.

Perhaps

that is part of the reason why observance of the spirit of the law was
weak.

That weakness showed up in the granting of political voice

but never power, in the gerry-mandering of districts, and in personal
ways such as the "foreign-duty" attitude of Czech officials in
Ruthenia.

There was a difference be.tween the attitudes of Czech

leadership and the attitudes of the Czech people toward the national
minorities.

The difference was understandable and showed signs of

being resolved.
Overall, how did the Czechoslovakian minorities rate their
situation? All evidence shows the Germans and Magyars remained
Germans and Magyars to the end.

They gave expedient lip service

to the new regime but would not make the transition from ruler to
ruled.

During the same time,, the Slovaks joined with the Czechs in

l
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building the country.

Perhaps most of the Slovaks did· so because

they saw the new state as their country.

THE POLISH MINORITIES: 1919 - 1938

The re-birth of .Poland was very painful.

Czechoslovakia

started its life with excellent leadership, a cadre of professional
occupations, a productive industrial complex, and the best wishes
of most of the world.

Poland's first days seemed almost friendless.

The British never were enthusiastic over a new Poland, the United
States was concerned with infringement on Russian rights, and
France, the one firm ally, was more interested in power balancing
than humanitarianism.
In February, 1919, the new Polish Parliament opened with a
major internal division.

On the

le~t

was Joseph Pilsudski, leader

of the Polish forces that fought Tsarist Russia.

On the right was

Roman Dmowski, leader of a very nationalistic group that supported
Polish forces fighting with France against the Central Powers.
Pilsudski emerged as the new leader but faced the constant opposition
of the Dmowski forces.
While Parliament debated and voted, the question of the
eastern boundary of Poland remained undecided.
moving westward as German forces withdrew.

Soviet Russia was

Pilsudski saw a need

to move Polish_ forces into terr.itory he considered to be part of the
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new Poland..

The result, a war with Soviet Russia, bears on this

study in that the Treaty of Riga, concluding the war on March 18,

1921, set the final eastern boundary of Poland.

That boundary

decision brought roughly 5, 000, O?O people into the new Poland, the
majority being Ukrainians and White Russians.

41

World War I and the war with Soviet Russia left Poland an
exhausted and politically divided country •. Poland was also divided
socially, for the Poles came from the three partitioned sectors of
Poland, where they had led quite different lives.

Unity was the first

·requirement and it was found in Polish nationalis1n, the same
nationalism that was ingrained in the other nationalities of Eastern
Europe.

It is this very strong Polish nationalism that should be kept

in mind as the thesis reviews the fate of the Polish minorities.

The Polish Germans
In 1921, Poland contained about 1, 000, 000 Germans out of a
total population of about 27, 000, 000. By 1931, the German total was.
42
down to 750, 000.
PromineD:t in industry and agriculture, but

41

see Appendix A for census breakdown. For a summary of
this little known but locally very important struggle,, see Halecki,
op. cit.,, pp. 283-89. Also see Robert :Machray, Poland~ 1914-1931,
(London: George Allen and Urwin, Ltd., 1932), pp. 182-85, and
Joseph Pilsudski, Year 1920, (London: Pilsudski Institute, 1972).
42

The 25% decline may have been due to emigration, but more
likely it was related to the census taking system. It was simply .
easier to. tell the census taker you were a Pole, especially·in the antiGerman climate of Poland in the years from 1921 to 1931.
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scattered rather widely over western Poland, German total numbers
were small but German problems were very large.

To this German

minority, the Poles extended their suspicion and an invitation: love
us or leave us.

Suspecting all Polish-Germans of being primarily

loyal to the German fatherland, there was never any serious attempt
to bring the German into the Polish government.
was also no serious German desire to join.

There apparently

According to Hugh

Seton-Watson, the Germans regarded their Polish residence as only
temporary.

They were supported in this view by all Berlin govern-

ments from Ebert to Hitler •. At the same time the Polish authorities
held to an equally "provocative attitude."

43

In this climate of

mutual distrust, the Hitler movement was quickly picked up by the
Polish-Germans.

By 1938, it was estimated that 75% of the German

minority was in full sympathy

~th the

Third Reich.

44

In education, the letter of the Treaty law may have been
observed but not the spirit.

Emphasis on Polish subjects and use of

Polish teachers with a poor mastery of the German language, were
among the stream of complaints coming from the Germans.

The

physical quality of school structures was also a common complaint
although it is noted that the number of strictly "Germanu schools was43
Hugh Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 2-79.

J. C. ~esse, "The Germans in Poland,
Review, op. cit., Vol. 16, p. 95.
44

11

in the Slavonic
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roughly proportionate to the minority population.

45

From all sides,

there was no doubt about the Polish desire to Polonize all areas.

This

policy reached into the classroom as well as the church and all other
channels of cultural life.
The same was true in economics, including agriculture.
"Land reform 11 meant breaking up the large German-held estates and
re-issuing them to

Polis~

farmers.

In some cases, the Poles

terminated land leases on Polish lands that had been granted to
Germans by the Prussian government.

This was in direct violation

of the property-rights section of the Treaty.

46

As the Poles moved

to nationalize certain parts of their industry, German firms seemed
to be a particular target.

47

In spite of these trends, 1938 saw the

Germans still dominating the industry of the important Lodz area and
continuing as the executives and technicians of Upper Silesia.
There were still other factors to consider.
a Polish minority in Germany of about I, 500, 000.
Germanization was generally recognized. 4 9
45
46

48

The Poles claimed
A Reich policy of

One of the principal

Buell, op. cit. , p. 242.
Ibid. , p. 243.

4 7He s s e, op. cit. , p. 9 7 •
48
. Buell, op. cit., pp. 246-4 7.

49

see Halecki, op. cit., pp. 257-58, for comments on
"Germanization" and "Hakatism, 11 a name applied to German nationalism. See also note 12, Chapter II.
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Polish objections to the Treaty (and acknowledged by the Conference)
was that the Poles in Germany were not covered by any guarantee of
rights.

A related irritant was the continuing action in the League of

Nations·. In 1926· Germany joined the League.

What followed was a

steady stream of German complaints over the alleged Polish mistreatment of the Ge.rman minority.

As the Germans complained from

their privileged sanctuary, the resentment of the Poles grew.
Knowing of the oppression of their relati"ves in Germany, the Poles
directed some of their res.entment against the Germans in Poland.
The reciprocity and League factors gained new importance in 1934
when the USSR became a League member.

Based on German use of

the League for minority complaints, Poland could see the USSR
doing the same thing on behalf of all the Ukrainians and White
Russians in the east.
the fall of 1934, that

This led to the Polish notice to the League, in
Pola~d

was henceforth refusing compliance with

.all minority provisions of the Treaty until such provisions were ex-

.
50
tended to all League members.
There does not seem to be any contention that a more benevolent policy toward the German minority would have changed the PolishGerman sympathies with the Third Reich•

It is more the thought that

the Poles accelerated those sympathies by denying the Polish-Gerr:nans
any alternatives.

50

Buell, op. cit. , p. 244.

97
The Polish-Jews
The dominant theme of post-war Poland was ·nationalism.
One reads repeatedly of the "Polonizing" programs among German
and Vkrainian groups, but not in the Jewish sectors.

At the govern-

mental level,, the major blame for the very existence of the Minority
Treaty was laid on the Jews.

The special sections regarding Jewish

rights were seen as a public warning of Polish anti-Semitism.

A

very inflamatory factor was the affection displayed by some Jews for
Ge~man

and Soviet societies,, in vi·ew of the fact that both Germany.

and the USSR were bitter enemies of Poland.

The National Democrats,,

under Dmowski,, preached hard-line nationalism and open antiSemitism.

On the left, Pilsudski, who was winning both the war and

the government, had to recognize the strength of the National
Democrats.

At times,, the Pilsudski -government deplored anti-

Semitic excesses but never took a firm stand.

51

At the people level, the basic hatred surfaced.

Economic

competition, religious conflicts, and cultural gaps, were all accented
by the Jewish "visibility." The result of all this was the polarizing,,
not Polonizing,· of the two sides.

52

The "alien" nature of the Jews

51

See Hugh Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 288-96, as well as
Buell, op. cit., Chapter XI, for documentation of the Jewish-Polish
position.

5211

Polarizing" is the author's personal description of situation.

.

i
I

I
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was accepted by the Poles as an inconvertible fact.

This marked

a change from pre-war partitioned Poland where Jewish assimilation

into Polish life was at least underway to some degree.

53

Politically, polarizing meant exclusion from any political
power. .Jewish parties elected deputies to the Polish Diet, but the
Jewis·h deputies had no effective vote.
the anti-Semitic trend.

Legislation seemed to follow

In 1924, the "Language laws" repeated

Treaty provisions regarding use of minority languages in legal and
civil situations, but excluded the Jews.
Law of 1927 recognized the

J~~ish

54

The Jewish Community

communities and councils, but

gave the government the right of supervision, approval of Jewish
officials, and even a degree of budget control.

55

Both of these laws

were in direct violation of Article Ten of the Treaty.

By 1934, the

government officially dispensed with all Treaty restrictions, and by
1936, came the declaration of the head of the Catholic Church: "One
does well to prefer his own kind in commercial dealings and to avoid
Jewish stores and Jewish stalls in the market, but it is not

53
· Heller, op. cit., Chapter VI ( 183-209) is entitled the
11
Assimilationistsll and treats this _situation in depth.

54

Buell, op. cit., pp. 295-96. The explanation was that
the Jews were dispersed throughout the country, thus requiring
all administrators to learn Yiddish.

55

Ibid. , p. 297.
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permissible to demolish Jewish businesses.

11

56

The year 1938

saw the National Democrats calling for complete prohibition of

Jewish rights in voting, office holding, and land ownership, with
total emigration as the only solution.

57

The economic situation was just as bad.

While no laws pre-

vented Jewish business activity, the polarized climate was a massive
hurdle.

Policies requiring prominent owner identification of b.usiness

establishments added to the problem, and in 1927, artisan licenses
were issued based on examinations in the Polish language only.

The

Polish objective appears to have been a ·gradual econonric strap.gulation
rather than outright eli:r:nination.
The·re never was any appreciable cultural exchange between
the pre-war Jewish and Polish communities, but neither were they
completely separate.

In the polarized atmosphere of independence,

all progress broke down.

Contrary to the Treaty, there were few

. .
f or J ewis
. h rmnor1
'•
•ty sc h oo1s. 58
provisions

In higher education, there

56

rbid., p. 299. This was in a pastoral lett.er issued during
a boycott of Jewish business.

57

Ibid., p. 300. In addition to these Buell citations, the
reader is referred to Stephan Horak, Poland and Her National
Minorities: 1919-1939, (New York: Vantage Press, Inc. 1961),
pp. 111-26, for further detail on the position of the Jews.
58
Joseph S. Roucek, 11Minorities," in Poland, ed.,
Bernadotte E. Schmidt, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1'947)_,
p. 161. Hereafter cited as Roucek.

100
was constant pressure for restrictions on Jewish professional
training through quota systems.

By 1935, the combination of the

Nazi movement and the death of Pilsudski brought renewed activity.
The universities were a hotbed of nationalism.

The infamous

"ghetto-bench" regulation was passed in 1933, requiring Jewish
students to use specified seats..

By 1936, Jews in higher education

were down 40% from 1923 and in medical schools, down 70%.

59

The

Jewish Sabbath, culturally as well as economically, was a great problem.

In the Polish-Catholic state, Sunday was, by law and custom,

a.day of rest.

In the climate of those times, both the Treaty pro-·

vision regarding the Sabbath and the weekly observances of the
Sabbath added to the total problem.
The special problem presented by the Polish-Jews was their
.separate existence.

The Jews claimed the desire to be left alone.

The Poles said to be

11

left alone" was not their idea of citizenship.

Poland, the Poles said, was for Poles.

Since there was no possible

. way for the Jew to be recognized by the Pole as a Pole,. the re was no
place for Polonizing, only polarizing.
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The Treaty never had a

chance.

S9Roucek, op. cit., p. 162. During this same period, nonJewish enrollmen~ in higher education was up by 50%.
l•

·6 0The comments regarding Jewish separ~tism are a·

.
summation of extensive reading in the Howe, Epstein,· and Heller
texts. It is believed to be a proper statement of the problem.
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Polish- Ukrainians
The Poles were completely opposed to the Minority Treaty.
In the case of the Ukrainians, the Poles felt the Treaty did not exist.
When the Treaty was signed, the eastern boundary was not determined.
It took two more years, a small war with the Ukrainians, a big war
with Soviet Russia, and the Treaty of Riga to decide the eastern
boundary of Poland.

That, according to a Pole, gave him the right

to run Galicia and the Volhynia
Poles.

district~

The Conference of Ambassadors

as a part of Poland, -for the
61

recognized Polish claims

on Galicia ·and Volhynia in 1923, without any Minority Treaty amendments or references.
Poland's claim on Galicia was not uncontested.

In 1920 and

again in 1922, conventions of all Ukrainian parties were held in
eastern Galicia,· proclaiming absolute opposition to Poland and inde pendence for the whole of Ukraine.

In September, 1922, Poland

passed a law providing for an a':ltonomous government for the Galician
provinces with Ukrainian majorities.

It was apparently merely an

appeasement gesture for its provisions were never carried out.
Furthermore, the

~ontinued

rise of the USSR and the bond between

the Soviet Ukraine and eastern Galicia, affected Polish plans.
61

The

Ambassadors of the Allied Powers as signed to final details
of the Versailles Treaty.

102
Poles saw autonomy for Galicia much as the Czechs saw it for
Ruthenia - merely the first step toward losing the land.

So the Polish policy was to Polonize the area.

The Polish

nationalist took the position that the Ukrainians were fellow-Slavs
with a language that was merely a local dialect.

Any Ukrainian

independence movement, according to the Polish nationalist, was the
work of a few individuals and not broadly based among the Ukrainian
pe'ople.

In short, the assimilation into Polish life should be quite

natural and brief.

Following this line,, political policy limited the

Ukrainians to representation without authority.

The civil service,

the military, the local power points, were all heavily Polish before
World War I, and now became even·more so.

Strong action was taken

against all things "Ukrainian" including even the Boy Scouts.
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This policy extended to economics wherever possible.

Land

reform was always called for, and was used as a form of colonizing.
Land was only taken from non-Polish interests and, in the main,
parceled out to Poles,, with the intent of developing local Polish
majorities.

Already controlling industry, the Poles mo_ved to tighten

their control over everything from the cooperatives to the bureaucracy.
The squeeze in education was part of the policy.
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.

Buell, op. cit., p. 276.

In pre-war
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years, Galicia had both a Polish and Ukrainian school system, side
by side and separate.' Under the laws of 1924, the Polish-Ukrainian

schools were set ·up and became the standard.
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This produced the

common Ukrainian complaint of Polish teachers and Polish bias.

The

bias was apparent in the lack of Ukrainian university students and in
conversion to all-Polish classes at the University of Lwbw.
The program of the National Democrats declared, "We shall
win the Slavic minority through assimilation of the masses and fight
against the hostile individual,"

64

.
and fight they did.

ation pressure increased, resistance broke out.

As the assimil-

The year 1930 saw

major Ukrainian terrorist activity against Polish policies,
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followed

by Polish "pacification" in which whole villages were punished for one
terrorist act.

Reacting to this violence, Poland eased ·off the

assimilation policy, encouraging more political representation, more
Ukrainian teachers, and more recognition of things Ukrainian.
Through 1938, however, the Ukrainian continued to protest against
Polish dominance in all phases of his life.

63

spe~ial

Ukrainian

Horak, op. cit., pp. 143-44.

64

65

The

Buell, op. cit., p. 276.

Machray, op. cit., pp. 406-08, and Hugh Seton-Watson
op. cit., pp. 334-35. These authors detail the activity of the
Ukrainian Military Organization and various extremist groups
in acts of sabotage and terrorism against Polish administrators
and Polish property, as well as the Polish "pa.cification 11 reaction.·
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problem faced by the Poles was the need to turn the Ukrainian local
majority into a contributing part of the Polish state.

The directed

·official policy of assimilation produced violence and strong
Ukrainian unity.·

It did not produce Polish citizens.

The tragedy of the Polish minority expe.rience must lie in the
waste of human resources.

If Poland needed anything, Poland needed

teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers, production
.designers.

man~gers,

and

Poland had them but it could not s.ee them because they

were Germans and Jews and Ukrainians.

If the Pole could have seen

a. doctor, not a Jew; could have seen an enginee;r, not a German;
could have seen a teacher, not a Ukrainian; they could have built
Poland by day and gone home to their traditional cultures by night
and just maybe, met in the park on a summer evening.
not their proble1n.

Time was

Leadership and vision might have shown the way.

More likely, the chaotic-birth, the Great Depression, the German
bugles, and the Soviet shadow made daily adverse reaction to each
other the only choice.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The men of the Paris Peace Conference tried to produce a
new map of Eastern Europe that followed the principle of selfdetermination and the lines of nationality.

Looking back over the

Conference action, one can be critical of the absence of any mention
of minority obligation.

One can bemoan the inability of the

Conference to require all countries to recognize certain basic
minority rights.

One can also cite numerous examples where the

principle of self-determination was abandoned or compromised.

On

the other hand, there were very positive accomplisl;i.ments - the
Poles and Czechs and Slovaks and the Southern Slavs all had their
new states, while Hungary was reduced to Hungarians and Austria
to Austrian-Germans.

The rights of the resulting minorities were

proclaimed by the Conference and spelled out in the· Minority
Treaties.

Giving due consideration to

th~

situations they faced,

the conferees accomplished their self-a.ssigned task.
While the boundary task was accomplished, the hoped-for
result - the unity of the population of each new state - was

a failure.

The early post World War II years saw only the separation ~£ the
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rulers and the ruled.

Throughout Eastern Europe the Germans

were sent back to Germany and the Jews either died or emigrated.

The Ukrainians and White Russians of Poland were annexed by the
USSR, as were the

Ru~henians

of Czechoslovakia.

Only the Magyars

of Czechoslovakia remained in Slovakia, where they are today,
still Magyars.
The Minority Treaties did not solve the problem of the
national minorities nor did the treaties provide any formula that has·
since led to any solution.

The problem - the reconciliation of the

interests of the rulers and the ruled - remains unsolved today.

If

one accepts the desirability of a world that includes "states of
nationalities" then the various "sclutions 11 since 1945 have been
admissions of defeat, or, resignations to a situation, not solutic:ms.
How have the interests of the rulers and the ruled been resolved since 1945? There have been few, if any, examples of true
reconciliation.

There has been only separation in the form of new

national states, or mass re-settlement of populations, or extermination.

Many of the unresolved situations have either erupted in

bitter warfare (Northern Ireland and Israel) or show signs of serious
political conflict (Quebec).
The hope for "states of nationalities" in which diverse
populations live together in peace and equality, must rely heavilY:
on an improved understanding of the interests of both sides, the
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rulers as well as the ruled.

To that end, the thesis examination of

the Minority Treaties, the Conference that created the treaties, and

Czechoslovakian and Polish minorities that resulted from the treaty
events, has illuminated certain characteristics of human behavior
and human relations.

These characteristics are as applicable .to the

world today as they were to the Czechs and Poles in the years
following World War I.
Foremost among these characteristics is the understanding
that nationality is a perception, not subject to any exact definition.

J

"I am what I am," is one way to put it. _R. W. Seton-Watson put it

. I

a -more complete way by contending, "A man's nationality • • . is

(

something compounded of race, language, tradition, and innermost
feeling . • • something physiological and sacred.

11

l

Being a

perception and containing elements of feeling -and affection, one 1 s
. nationality can the ref ore be changed.

While the Slovak remained a

Slovak in spite of the long Magyar rule, the Slovak that emigrated to
America became an American-Slovak within one generation.

In

America, his primary identification rapidly shifted to the state that
offered, in his opinion, the best chance to attain his aspirations.
The nationality change of so many of the American immigrants
could be repeated in many of today's minority situations.

That

1R. W. Seton-Watson, "The Question of Minorities" in
Slavic Review, op. cit., Vol. 14, · p. 80.

\
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possibility rests with the ruling majority.

It was, and still is,. the

task of the ruling majority to create a climate of opportunity that
matches the aspirations of the ruled minorities.

Such a climate

could make a major difference in Northern Ireland, in Israel, in
Zaire or Angola.

It could have made a difference in Eastern Europe,

but the rulers were too busy ruling to create such a climate.
The second revealed characteristic has to do with assimilation and the factor of acceptance.
similar" or "to absorb int_o the

Assimilation means, "to make

cultur~l

tradition of a population. "

Assimilation was the common policy of those years, and, as a
policy of a state, it proved to be counter-productive •. The. Magyars
could not make Magyars out of Slovaks or Ruthenians any more than
the Germans could make Germans out of Poles, or the Poles could
make Poles out of Ukrainians.

True, the rulers could get the votes

and the services of the ruled minority but the directed assimilation
also produced or encouraged terrorists, Pan-Slavic and Pan-·German
movements, and perpetuation of nationality.
The failure of directed assimilation is related to the factor
of acceptance.

In the years from. 1919 to 1938, there never was

exhibited concern over the acceptance of directives.

~n

Fresh out of

.an age of autocracy, "acceptance" simply n1.eant compliance.
Related to management affairs - and running a "state of

nationalities•~

is surely management - the acceptance of decisions, decrees, or
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policies, means agreement with the basic objectives.

In all matters

where the actions or behavior of the recipient of the directive is
vital to -the su~cess of the directive, the acceptance ia_ctor is critical.
At the local level, and often at the leadership level, neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland had a sufficient concern for the development of
this all-important factor.
There is no doubt that the reconciliation of the interests of
the majority and minority must involve some degree of assimilation.
Any alternative to separation such as federation or regional autonomy
or simply equality of citizenship, requires some level _of melding of
the interests and cultures of the two parties.

Assimilation, there-

fore, can well be a long-term objective, requiring the presence of

the factor of acceptance - but assimilation, via proclaimed policy, is
-doomed to fail.
The third characteristic revealed by this brief study is that
tolerance and legal freedoms do not equate with equality.

The

Minority Treaties set up a legal framework of freedom, specified a
climate of tolerance and repeatedly used the terms "equal" and
"equality." Yet, it is interesting to note that the definition of
"equal" specifies "like in quality, nature, or status,

11

while the

definition of "tolerance" refers to sympathy, indulgence, and
allowing, but does not mention equality.
Equality must be more of a perceived attitude than a definable
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.state.

Austria granted tolerance and freedoms to the Czechs, but

not equality and the Czechs replied in kind.

On today's scene, no

one can question the religious tolerance and legal freedom extended
by Canada to the F.rench-Canadians.

Despite this framework of

freedom, the separatist movement in Quebec grows as the FrenchCanadian seeks true equality, not tolerance.

In the view of the

minority, equality is equated more with perceived opportunity or
attainment of aspirations than with legality.

If an individual member

of a minority sees the ruling majority as a block to attainment of
his aspirations, then no degree of tolerance or legal freedoms will
do away with that perception.
Time is a prominent factor in most situations.
basic decision and on the developing solution.

It bears on the

A common character-

istic of human behavior is to let time alone provide a solution.

These

minority situations, however, carry the message that the passage of
decades, generations, or even centuries, do not change basic nationality perceptions.

It is true that time may give some assimilative

or healing factor a chance to diffuse and take effect, but time, by
itself, will do nothing.
that

11

This study provides a very real reminder

leaving them alone" will not make Israeli citizens out of Arabs,

or good neighbors out of the Catholic Irish of Northern Ireland, or
Spaniards out of Basques, any more than it made Magyars ·out of
Slovaks or Germans out of Poles.

If there is a minority problem

\

)

111

.confronting the state, then the state must address it today.

Time

will only bequeath the problem to the next generation, in full flower
and fury.

These four illuminated characteristics - the .perception of
nationality, the failure of directed assimilation and need for acceptance, the gap between equality and tolerance, and the role played by
time - have been viewed and reviewed many times before.

If these

characteristics contained, within themselves, the principal ingredients needed for a reconciliation of the interests of the rulers
and the ruled, then the world. should have seen many examples of such
reconciliations.

Unfortunately, the reverse is true.

There have been

very few reconciliations since 1945 and minority group demands are
proliferating.

There must, therefore, be other human characteristics

to consider.
On this point it is possible that the catalytic characteristic

is the rather uncommon one of humanitarianism, defined as,
".concern for human welfare.

11

All evidence suggests that both

Thomas Masaryk and Joseph Pilsudski w~re humanitarian leaders,
but that leader level was not the only place where the humanitarians
were needed.

The exhibiting of concern for human welfare was

needed on the street, in the factory, over the back fence, as well as

in the Parliaments.

With such a concern, the Polish employee might

have seeri the job applicant as a talented textile worker, not a Jew.
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In the same manner, humanitarianism might lead the English

employer in Ulster to view the Irish Catholic applicant as a qualified

dock worker, or the Israeli employer to see the Arab as a doctor.
Humanitarianism, as a single factor, will not reconcile the interests
of the rulers and the ruled.

The absence of humanitarianism, how-

ever, is a block to any hopes of such reconciliation, just as the
same absence from the local scenes in Czechoslovakia and Poland
turned the lvfinority Treaties into useless pieces of paper.
·The objective of this thesis is to promote, through a review of
some past minority problems, the listening to, and evaluation of, the
cries of today's minorities.

Among the more audible cries are those

of Palestine; Northern Ireland, and the African group.

Joining the

chorus are the ·Basques and Croats, the South Moluccans and
Azorians.
list.

The Bretons, Welsh, and Scots add to a still incomplete

It is a basic premise of the thesis that there is a desirable

place in the world for "states of nationalities" as well as national
states.

If one accepts that premis.e, then one must accept the need

for solutions of the minority problems that encompass reconciliation
as well as separation.

The thesis can contribute to understanding

and promote listening and evaluation, but the thesis cannot attempt
solutions.

The enormous complexity and the ever-lasting presence

of the problem of the national minority was well stated by President
Edward Benes in his review of Czechoslovakia's achieveme·nts and
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failures 'in the years up to 1938:
We have had, and still have, one problem;
a problem fraught with difficulty, now as for

centuries past on our territory, a problem
which calls for ever new forms of solution the problem of the nationalities. 2

2 HCR, op. cit., p. 187.
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APPENDIX A

POLAND: RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS STATISTICS*

Census of
30 September 1921
Poles
Ukrainians (Ruthenes)

Census of
9 December 1931

18,814,239
3, 898, 431

69. 2%
14.3

21,993,400
3, 277, 000

68. 9%
1o. 1

2, 110, 448
1,059,194
1, 060, 237
56,239
68,667
30,628

7.8
3.9
3.9
0.2
o. 3

2,732,600
741, 000
989,900
138,700

8.6
2.3
3. I
0.4

78, 634

0.3

Jews
Germans
White Russians
Russians
Lithuanians
Czechs
Others

27, 176, 717

O. I

878,600
31,915,800

Religions
Roman Catholic
Greek Catholic
Orthodox
Jewi.sh
Protestant
Others

20,670, 100
3,336,200
3, 762, 500
3, 113, 900
835,200
197,900

64. 8%
1o.4
11. 8

:9.8
2.6
0.6

*Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars: 1918-1941,
3rd ed.,. (Hamden: Arc hon Books, 1962), p. 414.
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APPENDIX B

CZECHOSLAVAKIA: RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS STATISTICS*

Census of
15 February 1921

Census of
1 December 1931

Czechoslovaks

8, 760, 937

65. 5%

9,668,770

66. 9%

Germans

3,123,568

23. 4

3,231,688

22.3

Magyars

745,431

5.6

691,923

4.7

Ruthenes (Ukainians)

461,849

3.5

549,169

5.7

Poles

75,853

0.5

81,737

0.5

Jews

180,855

1. 3

186,642

1. 29

Roumanians

13,974

o. 1

13,044

0.09

Gypsies

---

--

52,209

0.2

Others
13,374,364

14,729,536

Religions
Roman Catholic
Greek and Armenian Catholics
Protestant
Czechoslovak
Church

10, 831, 096
584,041
1,129,758
793,385

Orthodox

145,598

Jewish

356,830

Old Catholics
1

Konfessionslo.s'

Others

22,712
854,638
9,878

*Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars: 1918-1941,
3rd ed., (Hamden: Archon Books, 1962), p. 414. ·

2,007
4,382,816
Z,048,426
976
338
296, 194
85, 644
2,013,792
19,737 372,884
8,760,937 461,849

Poles

5,476
Z, 173,239
547,604
534
252,365
94
139,900 637, 183
1 o, 460 102, 144
3,123,568 754,431

973
2,080
69,967
2,536
297
75,853

of mother tongue)

Magyars

3,254, 189
709, 129
14,479,565
2,345,909
33,961
9,688,770

2,295,534

63,322
75,604
16,228
249,971

4,713,366

94,817

91,079
446,916
549,169

4,012

7, 162

147, 501
13,249
3,231,688

799,995

2,270,993

933
159
81,738

79,450

4, 012
571,988
109,472
691,223

1, 195
7, 603

Census of 1931 ***(conducted on the basis of mother tongue)

93,757
46,448
49,530
42,313
6,760
238,808

**(Conducted on the basis

slovaks

Ukrainians
and
Russians Germans

Others

Z,570

1,555

65,385 31,394
91,255 14,117
186,642 49,636

17, 267

12,735

11,251 1,091
15,335 1, 481
3,681
99
70, 529 8;973
80,059 14,227
180,855 25,871

Jews

*Mamatey and Luza, A History: of the Czechoslovak Republic: 1918-1948, (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1973), p. 40.
**The Statistical Handbook of the Czechoslovak Republic ***Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic
****After 1928 Silesia fused with Moravia constituting the Moravian-Silesian Province

Slovakia
Ruthenia
Republic

Aliens

Czecho~

Census of 1921

6,576,853
Z,616,436
622,738
Z,958,557
599,808
13,374,364

Czechoslovak
Citizens

Bohenua
7,041,559
~Aoraviaf***
·
3,
501.,
688
Silesia

Bohemia
Moravia
Silesia
Slovakia
Ruthenia
Republic

Territories
of Czechoslovakia

NATIONALITIES LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA*
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,APPENDIX D

WOODROW WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINT PLAN
FOR PEACE*

The program of the world•s peace, therefore, is our program;
and that program, the only

l.

pos~ible

program, as we see it, is this:

Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which

there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but
diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

ll.

Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside

territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas lllay
be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

m.

The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers

and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the
nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance.

IV.

Adequate guarantees given and taken that

ments will be reduced to the lowest point

c~nsistent

natio~l

arma-

with domestic

safety.

*From Wilson's address delivered at a Joint Session of Congress on
January 18, 1918. See Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations,
(Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1921), pp. 314-16.
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V.

A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment

of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle

that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of
the populations, concerned must have equal weight with the equitable
claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
VI.

The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settle-

ment of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and
freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining 'for
her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political

developme~nt

and national policy and

assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under
institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire.
The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to
come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their

compreh~nsion

her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
VII.

Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated

and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she
enjoys in common with all other free nations.

No ·other single act

will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations
in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the
governm·ent of their relations with one another.

Without this healing

of

'
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act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever
impaired.

VIII.

All French territory should be freed and the invaded

portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871
in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of
the world for nearly fifty years, should be righte?, in order that
peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.
IX.

A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected

along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
X.

The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place ar..nong the

nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded
the freest opportunity of autonomous development.
XI.

Rumania, Servia, and Montenegro should be evacuated;

occupied territories restored; Servia accorded free and secure
access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to
one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees
of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of
the several Balkan states should be entered into.
XII.

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should
I

be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are
now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of

.life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous develop-
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rnent, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free
passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international

guarantees.
XIII.

An independent Polish state should be erected which

should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish
populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to
the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial
integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.
XIV.

A general association of nations must be formed under

specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of
political independence and territorial integrity to great and small
states alike.
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APPENDIX. E

MINORITY TREATY BETWEEN POLAND AND
THE ALLIED AND PRINCIPAL POWERS*

CHAPTER I

ARTICLE 1

Poland undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles

2 to 8 of this Chapter shall be rec-0gnized as fundamental laws, and
that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere
with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official
action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2

Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of
life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of
birth, nationality, language, race or religion.
All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise,.
whether public or private, or any creed, religion or belief, whose

*Appendix includes only Chapter I of the treaty. Chapter II deals
only with diplomatic and commercial provisions not relevant to
this thesis •. See H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History: of the Peace
Conference of Paris, 6 VoL, (London: Inst~tute of Inter.national
Affairs, 1921 ), Vol. 5, pp •. 798-801.
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practices are .not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

ARTICLE 3

Poland admits and declares to be Polish

nat~onals l:P.so

facto

and without the requirement of any formality German, Austrian,
Hungarian or Russian nationals· habitually resident at the date of the
contlng into force of the present Treaty in territory which is or may
be recognized as forming part of Poland, but subject to any provisions
I

in the Treaties of Peace with Germany or Austria respectively relating to persons who became resident in such territory after a
specified date.
Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over
eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained
in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be
open to them.

Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by

parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.
Persons who have exercised the above right to opt

mu~t,

except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with
..

Germany, transfer within the succeeding twelve months their place
of residence to the State for which they have opted.

They will be

entitled to retain their immovable property in Polish territory.
~ay

They

carry with them their movable property of every description.

export duties may be imposed upo~ them in connection with the re.:.·

No
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moval of such property •

.ARTICLE 4

Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals ipso facto
and without the requirement of any formality persons of German,
Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationality who were born in the
said territory of parents habitually resident there, even if at the

dat~ of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not them-:
i

sehtes habitually resident there.
I

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of
the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before
the competent Polish authorities in the country in which they are
resident, stating -that they abandon Polish nationality, and they will
then cease to be considered as Polish nationals.

In this connection

a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaJ;ation by

parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

ARTICLE 5

Poland undertakes to put ·no hindrance in the way of the
exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, unde·r the
Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated
Powers with Germany, Austria, Hungary or
or not they will acquire Polish nationality.

Ru~sia,

to choose whether
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ARTICLE 6

All persons born in Polish territory who are not born
nationals of another State shall ipso facto become Polish nationals.

ARTICLE 7

All Polish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall
enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race,
language or religion.
Differences of religion, creed or -confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of
ci.vil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and
industries.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish
national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in
religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at· public
meetings.
Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government
of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Polish
nationals of

non~Polisb

speech for the use of their language, either

orally or in writing, before the courts •

..

I!
•~
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.ARTICLE 8

Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic
minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in
fact as the other Polish nationals.

In particular they shall have an

equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense
charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other
educational establishments, with the right to use ·their own language
and to exerci"se their religion freely therein.·

ARTICLE 9

Poland will provide in the public educational system in towns
and districts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals
of other than Polish speech are residents adequate facilities fo.r
ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given
to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of. their
own language.

This proVision shall not prevent the Polish Govern-

ment from making the teaching of the Polish language obligatory in
the said schools.
In towns and districts where there is a
portion of Polish

natio~als

~onsiderable

belonging to racial, religious or

proli~guistic

minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in
the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be proVi.ded
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out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for
educational, religious or charitable pruposes.
The provisions of this Artide shall apply to Polish citizens
of German speech only in that part of Poland which was German
territory on August 1, 1914.

ARTICLE 10

Educational Committees appointed locally by the Jewish
communities of Poland will, subject to the general control of the
State, provide for the distribution of the·proportional share of public
funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 9, and
for the organization and management of these schools.
The provisions of A:t;ticle 9 concerning the use .of languages in
schools shall apply to these schools.

ARTICLE 11

Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under
any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to
perform any legal business on their Sabbath •. This provision however
shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed
upon all qther Polisq. citizens for the necessary purposes of military
service, -national defence or· the preservation of public order.
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Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering or
permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held on a
Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other pruposes be
compelled to be performed on a Saturday.

ARTICLE 12

Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing

Article~,

so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or
linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern
and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.
They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the
Council of the League of Nations.

The United States, the British

Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their
·assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form
assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.
Poland agrees that any Member o{ the Council of the League
of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council
any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations,
and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such
direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.
Poland further agrees that any difference of opinion as to
questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the
Polish Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated
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Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League
of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character

under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The

Polish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall,

if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent
Court of International Justice.

The decision of the Permanent Court

shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award
under Article 13 of the Covenant.
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.!\PPENDIX F

MINORITY TREATY BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND
THE ALLIED PRINCIPAL POWERS*

CHAPTER I

.ARTICLE 1

Czecho-Slovakia

un.dert~kes

that the stipulations contained in

Articles 2 to 8 of this Chapter shall be recognized as fundamental
laws and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or
interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or
official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to assure full and complete
protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Czecho-Slovakia
without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Czecho-Slovakia shall be entitled to the free
exercise, whether public or private, ·of any creed, religion or

*Appendix includes only Chapters I and II of the treaty. Chapter III
deals only with diploma~ic and commercial provisions not releyant
to this thesis. See H. W. V. Temperley, ed.• A History of the Peace
Conference of Paris, 6 Vol., (London: Institute of International
Affairs, 192.1), ·Vol. 5, pp. 811-815.
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belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or
public morals.

ARTICLE 3

·subject to the special provisions of the Treaties mentioned
below, Czecho-Slovakia admits and declares to be Czecho-Slovak
nationals ipso facto and without the requirement of any formality
German, Austrian or Hungarian nationals habitually resident or
possessing rights of citizenship (P.ertinenza1 Heimatsrecht) as the case
may be at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in
territory which is or may be recognized as forming part of CzechoSlovakia under the Treaties with Germany, Austria or Hungary
respectively, or under any Treaties which may be ·concluded for the
purpose of completing the present settlement.·
Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over
eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions

c~ntained

in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be
open to them.

Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by

parents will cover their children under eighteen years ·of age·.
Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must
within the succeeding twelve mc:>nths transfer their place of residence
to the State for which they have opted.

They will be entitled to retain

their immovable property in Czecho-Slovak territory.

They may

l
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carry with them their movable property of every description.

No

export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with· the

removal of such property.
ARTICLE 4

Czecho-Slovakia admits and declares to be Czecho-Slovak
nationals ipso facto and without the requirement of any formality
persons of German, Austrian or Hungarian nationality who were born.
in the territory referred to above

~f

parents habitually resident or

possessing rights of citizenship (P.ertinenza, Heimatsrecht) as the
case may be there, even if at the date of the coming into force· of the
present Treaty they are not themselves habitually reside.nt or did not
possess rights of citizenship there.
Nevertheless, within two y·ears after the coming into force of
the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before
the competent Czecho-Slovak authorities in the

~ountry

in which they

are resident, stating that they abandon Czecho-Slovak nationality,
and they will then cease to be considered as Czecho-Slovak nationals.
In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife,· and
a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years
of age.
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ARTICLE 5

Czecho-.Slovakia undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of
the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have under
the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Germany, Austria or Hungary to choose whether
or not they will acquire Czecho-Slovak nationality.

ARTICLE 6

All persons born in Czecho-Slovak territory who are not
born nationals of another State shall ipso facto become Czecho:Slovak nationals.

ARTICLE 7

All Czecho-Slovak nationals shall be equal before the law and

shall enjoy the. same civil and political rights without distinction as
to

race~

language or religion.·

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice
any Czecho-Slovak national in matters relating to the enjoyment of

civil o_r political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions

an~

honours, or the exercise of professions and

industries.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Czecho-
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Slovak national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce,
in religion, in the press or publications of any kind, or at public

.l.

meetings •
Notwithstanding any establishment by the Czecho-Slovak
Government of an official language, adequate facilties shall be given
to Czecho-Slovak nationals of non-Czech speech for the use of their
language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE 8

Czech9-Slovak nationals who belong to racial, religious or
linguistic minorlties shall enjoy the same treatment and security in
law and in fact as the other Czecho-Slovak nationals.

In particular

they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at
their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions,
schools, and other educational establishments, with the right to use
their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 9

Czecho-Slovakia will provide in the public educational system
in.towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of CzechoSlovak nationals of other than Czech speech are residents adequate
facilities for ensuring that the instruction shall be given to the
children of such Czecho-Slovak nationals through the medium of their

l
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own language.

This provision shall not prevent the Czecho-Slovak

Government from making the teaching of the Czech language

obligatory.
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion
of Czech-Slovak nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic
minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in
the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided
-0ut of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for
-educational, religious or charitable purposes.

CHAPTER II

ARTICLE 10

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to constitute the Ruthene territory
south of the Carpathians within frontiers delimited by the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers as an autonomous unit within the
Czech-Slovak State, and to accord to it the fullest degree of selfgovernment compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State.

ARTICLE 11

The Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians shall possess.
a special Diet.

This Diet shall have powers of legislation in all

linguistic, scholastic and religio~s questions, in matters of local

1
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administration, and in .other questions .which the laws of the CzechSlovak State may assign to it·.

The Governor of the Ruthene

territory shall be appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak
Republic and shall be responsible to the Ruthene Diet.

ARTICLE 12

Czecho-:-Slovakia agrees that officials in the Ruthene

~erritory

will be chosen as far as possible from the inhabitants of this

territory.

ARTICLE 13

Czecho-Slovakia guarantees to the Ruthe·ne territory equitable
representation in the legislative assembly of the Czecho-Slovak
Republic, to which Assembly it will send deputies elected according
to the constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

These deputies

will not, however, have the right of voting in the Czecho-Slovak

Diet upon legislative questions of the same kind as those assigned

to the Ruthene ·Diet.

.ARTICLE 14

Czecho-Slovakia agrees that the· stipulations of Chapters I
and II so far as they affect pet-sons belonging to racial. religious
<>r linguistic minorities constitute obligations of international

l

i
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concern and shall be placed
Nations.

und~r

the guarantee of the League of

They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority

of the Council of the League of Nations.

The United States, the

British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is
in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the Lea.gue
of Nations.
Czecho-Slovakia agrees that any Member of the Council of
the League of Nations shall have the

rig~t

to bring to the attention

of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of .
these

obligation~,

and that the Council may thereupon take such

action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective
in the circumstances.
Czecho-Slovakia further agrees that any difference of opinion
as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between
the Czecho-Slovak Government and any one of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers or any other Power,

a Member

of the Coup.cil

of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14. of the Covenant o~ the League
of Nations.

The Czecho-Slovak Government hereby c_onsents that

any such dispute shall, if the other party hereto demands, be re£erred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The

decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the
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same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the
Covenant.
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APPENDIX G

CZECHO-SLOVAK LANGUAGE LAW OF
FEBRUARY 29, 1920;~

1.

'The Czecho-Slovak language is the state (official)

language of the Republic.' Thi_s clause of course .represents a
legal fiction, since there is no such thing as a Czecho-Slovak
language, but only two intimately related dialects, enjoyi:ng full
parity in the administration, justice and education.

As, however,

the name 'Czecho-Slovak' had won general recognition and already
stood as the symbol of unity, it appears to have been felt that to
refer to the 'Czech and Slovak language' or 1 languages' would have
been not only a contradiction in terms, but actually a step away

from fusion.
2.

In districts containing a racial minority of at least 20 per

cent, the authorities are bound to transact business with any of its
members in their own language, and to is sue all proclamati_ons and
official notices in the language of
Slovak.

~he

minority as well as in Czecho-

The Public Prosecutor is bound to bring his indictment in

the language of the accused.

*H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the. Peace Conference of
Paris, 6 Vol., {London: Institute of International Affairs, 192"1 ),
Vol. 5, p. 470.
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3.

The authorities are everywhere bound to accept oral and

written communications in the Czecho-Slovak language and to sanction

its use at any meeting: in other languages, only where these are
spoken by 20 per cent of the population of the particular district.
4.

Czech and Slovak are treated as alternative.

5.

The mother-tongue is to be the language of instruction

in all minority schools.

6. Linguistic provisions for Carpatho-Ruthenia are provisional, un.til its provincial Diet can meet and decide the question.
7.

Linguistic disputes are to be decided as ordinary matters

of administrative inquiry.
8.

Practical executive. details are to be is sued by dee ree.

